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Why do Legislators pay Attention to Policy Information? : An Eye-Tracking Experiment with Legislators
Type
conference paper
Date Issued
2014-09-09
Author(s)
Abstract
Existing theoretical accounts on legislators' information behavior are eclectic. In one way or another, these accounts suggest that legislators use or ignore information based on its potential to solve a policy problem or enhance career prospects. We argue that these reasons do not represent triggers strong enough for an individual legislator to engage herself in the cognitive work necessary. Instead, we suggest that legislators have no substantial interest in policy-relevant information until their political intuitions are in conflict and fail to provide orientation. Only then does information search and use behavior precede judgments. If political intuitions are in line, information search and use are employed post hoc and provide arguments for the position that has been reached intuitively. To test the hypotheses that follow from this model on legislators' information interest, search, and use, we conduct an eye-tracking experiment with 56 legislators. Eye-tracking metrics highlight that if political intuitions are contradicted, legislators' interest in available information is more intense, their search behavior is less distorted, and available information is used dif-ferently during the deliberation process. We conclude that an intuitionist model of information behavior provides more plausible explanations for legislators' observed information behavior in the political arena.
Project(s)
Language
English
Keywords
Legislators
Policy Information
Decision-making
Budgeting
Experiment
Eye-Tracking
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Event Title
36th EGPA European Group of Public Administration Annual Conference
Event Location
Speyer
Event Date
08.-12.09.2014
Subject(s)
Eprints ID
234449