Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences
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versione breve
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A core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable
preferences. We test this assumption in public goods games by
repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool
over a period of five months. We find that cooperation preferences
are very stable at the aggregate level, and, to a smaller degree, at
the individual level, allowing us to predict future behavior fairly
accurately. Furthermore, our results provide evidence on the
psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. The
personality dimension ‘Agreeableness’ is closely related
to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences.
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tipo
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Journal paper
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parole chiave
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Social preferences; Preference stability; Conditional cooperation; Free riding; Personality; Big-Five
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lingua
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English
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kind of paper
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journal article
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data di apparenza
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11-11-2011
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giornale
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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Editore
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Elsevier
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ISSN
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0167-2681
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DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.006
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edizione del giornale
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2011
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numero del giornale
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999
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pagine
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1-13
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review
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double-blind review
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profile area
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SEPS - Economic Policy
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citation
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Volk, S., Thöni, C., & Ruigrok, W. (2011). Temporal stability and
psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011(999), 1-13,
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.006.
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