REFLECTIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

Peter L. Berger
Institute for the Study of Economic Culture
Boston University

A number of times during recent years I have come across references to this book as a “classic” (sometimes, in a more humbling mode, as a “minor classic”). This is, of course, very gratifying, as was Chris Prendergast’s generous invitation to contribute these reflections. As with most gratifications in this life, there is a disturbing downside. The author of a “classic” (even a minor one) is commonly assumed to be deceased or soon to be so, which is a condition to which I do not as yet aspire. Be this as it may, I will do my best to rise (no pun intended) to the occasion.

When Thomas Luckmann and I decided to write this book, in the early 1960’s, our intentions were quite modest. We were both junior members of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, our common alma mater to which we had returned after some years of teaching elsewhere. We found ourselves in the lucky situation of being in the company of a small but lively group of young colleagues and graduate students who broadly shared a theoretical orientation, the one that all of us had learned from our teacher Alfred Schutz. One of Schutz’s unrealized projects had been to formulate a new theoretical foundation for the sociology of knowledge in terms of his blend of phenomenology and Weberian theory. We intended to realize this project.

It was only in the course of working on the book that we discovered, to our own surprise, that the project developed a more ambitious scope. A broad theoretical paradigm for doing sociology seemed to take shape under our hands. This excited and pleased us, but, although we were young enough for any amount of chutzpah, we did not expect that many other people would share our excitement. We were conscious of our marginality in relation to the American sociological enterprise and we did not anticipate the changes that were about to occur in the field (changes, as it turned out, which did not make us any less marginal). When the book was finished, however, we were very happy with the result. Nothing that has happened since then has made us change our minds. Both of us, as we recently decided once again, would change very little in the book if we were to rewrite it today, and both of us have found its theoretical paradigm eminently useful as we turned our attention to a number of different areas of empirical inquiry.

One question asked by the editor in his letter of invitation was, “Did you mean to found a school of social theory, in which case why did you decline to lead it?” I have already answered the first part of the question; as to the second part, one can only decline an offer that has been made. No one offered. Even if one allows that the paradigm proposed by us might have formed the basis of a “school,” the failure of such a development is not difficult to explain. There is, of course, the obvious fact that we were situated in an emphatically peripheral, non-elite institution. But even if we had been on the faculty of, say, Harvard or Columbia (a fate I would not necessarily wish on either one of us), I’m not at all sure that the history of these ideas would have been very different. The book was published and attracted widespread attention during what, as is now clear, was a very narrow window of opportunity for a reconstruction of sociology. In 1966, when the book came out, there was broad dissatisfaction with what had been the long hegemony of structural-functionalism in
theory and a narrow positivism in the day-to-day practice of most sociologists. Especially younger people in the discipline were looking for something new, something that would transcend the aridity of both Parsonian scholasticism and the endless refinements of quantitative techniques. Something new was indeed about to engulf sociology, but it was not the marriage of Weber and Schutz celebrated in *The Social Construction of Reality*. It was, of course, the orgy of ideology and utopianism that erupted all over the academic scene in the late 1960's, almost immediately after the publication of our book. Neither Luckmann nor I had any sympathy with this *Zeitgeist*, but even if we had been more sympathetic, our sort of sociology was not what all these putative revolutionaries were clamoring for. It is not possible to play chamber music at a rock festival.

The collaboration between Luckmann (who remains one of my closest friends) and me ended for the very simple reason that he accepted a position in Europe; it is possible to collaborate on empirical studies across oceans, but joint work in theory requires (to mix a Weberian and Schutzian phrase) the *pianissimo* of the face-to-face situation. Luckmann must speak for himself on how he sees his relationship to the organized discipline, but I have long reconciled myself to my marginality with respect to the American sociological establishment (which, though perhaps I have missed something, does not seem to me more congenial than it was two decades ago). Although I have continued to do sociology, I have done so in an increasingly interdisciplinary context, a situation in which I feel very comfortable.

Not long after our little group in New York dispersed in all directions, and for reasons that had nothing to do with this, I became interested in problems of modernization and Third World development, and these problems have remained my major intellectual focus ever since. The paradigm that we developed in *Social Construction* has shown itself to be eminently applicable. Modernization can only be understood if one perceives it as a phenomenon both of institutional change and of transformations of consciousness, and it is precisely this duality that the paradigm was meant to deal with. Obviously this is not the place to demonstrate this claim, so I can only affirm my satisfaction that this theoretical orientation has shown itself, time and again, to be useful in illuminating concrete empirical discipline. Since 1985 I have directed the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University, which now brings together a singularly directed the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at World development, and these problems have remained my major intellectual focus ever since. The paradigm that we developed in *Social Construction* has shown itself to be eminently applicable. Modernization can only be understood if one perceives it as a phenomenon both of institutional change and of transformations of consciousness, and it is precisely this duality that the paradigm was meant to deal with. Obviously this is not the place to demonstrate this claim, so I can only affirm my satisfaction that this theoretical orientation has shown itself, time and again, to be useful in illuminating concrete empirical discipline. Since 1985 I have directed the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University, which now brings together a singularly directed
BERGER AND LUCKMANN CELEBRATION

This issue of Perspectives is devoted to reflections on Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966), one of the great feats of theoretical synthesis in American sociology. The book inspired many theorists trained during the last quarter century, including the editor. It seemed appropriate to use the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary to spark reflections both personal and critical.

There are six contributions in addition to the essays by Berger and Luckmann. Four contributors identify with the phenomenological tradition, Americans Doyle McCarthy and Mary Rogers and Europeans Thomas Eberle and Hans-Georg Soeffner. They are joined by critics Charles Lemert and John Meyer. Each was asked to recount their first exposure to the book and its significance to them as theorists. In addition, the Europeans were asked to focus on Luckmann’s recent work, which is unknown in America. The result is the first discussion of Luckmann’s research on “communicative genres” in English.

The essays by Berger and Luckmann are important documents in their own right. Many observers have wondered why Social Construction was not followed by other joint work, why Berger turned away from theoretical sociology toward development studies, and why the paradigm failed to develop. In their essays, Berger and Luckmann address these questions frankly and directly. An important recurrent theme is the anti-ideological posture of the phenomenological movement, a point reinforced by Soeffner.

THEORY PRIZE: CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

The Theory Prize Committee has set May 1 as the deadline for nominations for this year's outstanding work in sociological theory. Both books and papers may be nominated, but it looks like the prize will be awarded to a paper this year.

Members attending the business meeting in August will recall a resolution authorizing a prize for books. Unfortunately, the by-laws of the section must be amended first. The committee is rewriting the amendment now.

Nominations should include a cover letter and five copies of the text. It is not necessary to conceal the author(s)'s name(s). The committee favors papers that promise to have a lasting impact in one or more fields of theoretical inquiry. Nominees should be members of the A.S.A. Authors may submit their own work.

The members of the Theory Prize Committee are Anne Rawls (Wayne State, Chair), Jeffrey C. Alexander (UCLA), Bernard Barber (Columbia), Ruth Wallace (George Washington), and Michael Hechter (Arizona). Send materials to Anne Rawls, Faculty/Administration Building, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202; tel: (313) 577-8973.

A.S.A. THEORY SESSIONS AND PRESENTERS

An “author meets critics” session will be one of five panels organized by the theory section at the A.S.A. meetings in August. The session is devoted to the work of Dorothy Smith, a feminist theorist and epistemologist. The panel (organized by Barrie Thorne and Barbara Laslett) features Craig Calhoun (North Carolina), Johanna Esseveld (Lund), Judith Howard (Washington), and Iris Young (Pittsburgh).

This year's mini-conference, organized by Craig Calhoun, is on the theme, “From Persons to Nations: The Social Constitution of Identities.” The first session features papers on the social constitution of citizenship by Margaret Somers (Michigan), the politics of identity in American history by Norbert Wiley (Illinois), the formation of we-images by Stephen Mennell (Australia), and black feminist thought by Charles Lemert (Wesleyan), with Elizabeth Long (Rice) as discussant. The second panel includes Eli Zaretsky (Missouri) on identity theory and identity politics, Tia DeNora (Wales) and Hugh Mehan (UC-San Diego) on the social construction of genius, Thomas Scheff on theories of nationalism, and Lauren Langman (Loyola) on nation and self, with Anna Giza-Poleszuk (Warsaw) as discussant.

The regular session, organized by Alan Wolfe (New School), is on “Morality and Society.” It features papers on moral fictions by Michèle Lamont (Princeton), deindustrialization, morality and the state by Katherine Dudley (Columbia), and healing powers by Fred Frohock (Syracuse), with discussant to be announced.

Finally, twenty roundtable sessions feature both familiar and fresh faces, including Richard Münch, Robert Alford, Benjamin Gregg (on law), Jan Azner (on Parsons and free will), Carlos Forment, Valerie Haines, Diane Margolis, Jeff Livesay, Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin (on network analysis and historical sociology), Steven Seidman, Douglas Porpora and Kyle Cleveland (on objective interests), Sunita Parikh (on interpreting history as a game), Jodi O’Brien, Adam Seligman (on trust), Mustafa Ozcak, Lyn Spillman, Joseph Whitmeyer (on power), Mohammed Bamyeh (a MacArthur Fellow from Berlin, on global consciousness), Keith Douth, and George Zito and Nicholas Tatsis (on the social meanings of silence).

The social psychology section will also have a mini-conference at the A.S.A. on “Structure in Social Psychology.” Peter Callero (Western Oregon), Bernard Cohen (Stanford), David Willer and John Skvoretz (South Carolina), and Noah Friedkin (UC-Santa Barbara) will contribute to the first session, with Jane Sell (Texas A&M) as discussant. Cecilia Riedgeway (Stanford) will chair the second session.
Habent suatfita libelli! And what a peculiar fate this book had! When Peter Berger and I, after preliminary practice in working together which led to some articles on religion, knowledge and social mobility, began writing "our" book, we never dreamt it would become a "great success"--even success measured merely by sales or citations. And, we anticipated it as a remote possibility, we would have certainly laughed in disbelief at the suggestion that it could turn out to be a mixed blessing.

To begin with the dubious part of the mixture: A goodly part of the "success" of Social Construction must have been due to inattentive reading. Occasionally I even suspected that among those who either purchased or cited the book there must have been some who only read the title, lightly skipping over the "social" part of it, and some whose attention remained riveted to the (non-) dedication of the book to a "Jodler." (A yodeller, indeed! In fact, he played the zither.) The old saying caveat emptor should be complemented by caveat auctores! In any case, whenever someone mentions "constructivism" or even "social constructionism," I run for cover these days. But, while I cannot speak for Peter, I was certainly pleased by the sales of the book in its original edition as well as in its repentations. Occasionally I even suspected that due to inattentive reading. Occasionally I even suspected that among those who either purchased or cited the book there must have been some who only read the title, lightly skipping over the "social" part of it, and some whose attention remained riveted to the (non-) dedication of the book to a "Jodler." (A yodeller, indeed! In fact, he played the zither.) The old saying caveat emptor should be complemented by caveat auctores! In any case, whenever someone mentions "constructivism" or even "social constructionism," I run for cover these days. But, while I cannot speak for Peter, I was certainly pleased by the sales of the book in its original edition as well as in its many translations. Last but not least, I profited from the productive, critical arguments offered by attentive readers of the book. I found a number of those among colleagues and students.

I was surprised by the interest in Social Construction among anthropologists, geographers and historians, here and there in linguistics and literary theory, and in such divergent disciplines as ethology and theology. This not only flattered my vanity but also confirmed my hope that the position Berger and I developed from various sources, most especially from the "interpretive" sociology of Weber and Schutz, had some relevance for the human sciences.

A year before the publication of the book, I left the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research (where Peter and I had met in a seminar of the philosopher Karl Löwith and where we later taught together) in order to accept a professorship at the University of Frankfurt. After five years in the partially amusing vicinities of the cathedral of "critical" sociology I moved to the University of Constance. I returned frequently to the United States but, except for half a year in Cambridge and one in Palo Alto, only for short visits. I mention this for a reason. Apart from occasional writing in phenomenology, the philosophy of social science, the theory of language and personal identity, and the sociology of language, all my later empirical work was with European, mostly German colleagues, assistants and students, and, more importantly, with data formulated and analyzed in German.

Although I thought--as I still think today--that Social Construction provides a fair general understanding of the freedoms and constraints governing the social interactions through which human beings create the world in which they live and, conversely, the processes through which the historical worlds thus created in turn create the human beings born into them, I was eager to learn more about the concrete workings of these intricate processes. During the past two decades I increasingly turned to the detailed investigation of the structures and functions of the communicative processes through which "realities" are constructed and reconstructed on different levels of a society.

My training in linguistics, my old interests in the sociology of language, highly instructive readings in the ethnography of communication (and occasional contact with Hymes and Gumperz), profitable study of Goffman's Forms of Talk, useful interchanges with conversation analysts (first with Sacks and then with younger members of that persuasion), regular meetings with a small international group of social psychologists converted from rather arid paradigms to a dialogical, essentially Bakhtinian approach, contacts with a group of Swedish colleagues engaged in the interdisciplinary study of communication and, after my coming to Constance, continued conversations with a group of historians, especially literary historians whose articulation of literary "reception theory" generated an interest in the sociology of knowledge--all this may help to explain my turn to what my old friend Peter calls "microsociological" analysis. But I see this a logical (could I see it otherwise?) empirical extension of our joint thinking which may be of considerable "macrosociological" relevance.

Over ten years ago I began to link the interactionist social theory and sociology of knowledge sketched in Social Construction to a program for the investigation of concrete communicative processes. These conceptual links, called by some a "theory" of communicative genres, start from the assumption that for recurring communicative problems in social interactions, more or less obligatory patterns of the organization of the communicative process are constructed socially. The system of genres in use, as well as less obligatorily structured communication in social milieus and institutions, may be conceived as the communicative budget of a society. I am convinced that a description of continuities and changes...
in communicative budgets is a prerequisite for the description and explanation of social stability and change. It provides the formal empirical basis for a study of the manifold historical permutations of the social construction of reality.

The first studies guided by that theoretical program looked at communicative processes which reconstruct various kinds of pasts: alarm calls to the fire department, gossip, conversational transmissions of information and wisdom, religious conversion stories, recapitulations of television programs, etc. The next four-year study will focus on "moralizing" genres. The data will consist of public debates during the Gulf War, "pastoral" counselling on radio programs, anti-smoking campaigns, local ecology appeals, pro- and anti-abortion arguments in various public and semi-public contexts, and the like.

I see that I wrote of my recent work in rather too much detail. I hope, however, that I succeeded in showing its connection to the book I wrote with Peter Berger so long ago.

Incidentally, the fact that I haven't collaborated with him since then is attributable to geographical, not intellectual distance. In any case, retirement from official duties is approaching in a few years. If we are still healthy we may resume a venture we planned half-jokingly many years ago--formulating a "theory" of the unnecessary declines of states and societies, focusing on the role played therein by the intelligentsia and the "experts" in social constructions of reality, especially the masters of self-fulfilling prophecies. Just as well that I have no space for a message. I have none.

References

"THIS LITTLE BOOK" AND ITS LEGACY
E. Doyle McCarthy
Fordham University

I was introduced to Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality in 1968 when I started graduate studies at the New School for Social Research. In a seminar in sociological theory, the graduate assistant leading the day's discussion engaged in a bit of prediction at the seminar's beginning. He held up the paper edition of the book with the cover design by Norman Ives in attention-getting orange, and biting his pipe as he spoke, suggested that, in his view, "this little book" would, in time, have an enormous impact on American sociology. As sociologists' predictions go, not bad.

Now almost twenty-four years later, it is difficult to imagine a more important work for an entire generation, if we mean by that a work we drew upon as a model for how to think and write sociological theory. Continuing sociology's conversation with the classical theorists and focused specifically on the sociology of knowledge, the work argued a radical rethinking of the foundational problem of "knowledge" and "reality." Social Construction identified as a sociological problem what was commonly considered the terrain of philosophy--the constitution of reality. In so doing, Berger and Luckmann demonstrated that sociology could study any part of reality from within its own discipline's presuppositions. This work and others by Berger (his essays on identity and on psychoanalysis, as well as his books on religion) demonstrated that sociologists could, with authority, venture into areas previously claimed by psychology or theology, or for that matter, medicine. Since this book, and undoubtedly because of it, there is almost no domain of knowledge free from the scrutiny of "constructionism," as contemporary studies of the body and emotions testify.

The central thesis--that knowledge constitutes social reality--launched a new phase of social scientific inquiry, reoriented the sociology of knowledge, and put empirical sociology on a new footing. The focus of this reposition became the broad range of signifying systems that form and communicate social realities. This focus animated empirical work for two decades and forced theoreticians to formulate a theory of culture consistent with the work being done in cognitive psychology and anthropology, linguistics, and semiotics.

In other ways, this volume prepared American sociology for its current postpositivist stance, especially with the claim that all knowledges (theoretical and pretheoretical) are continuous with one another and that all "typifications" are part of particular historical contexts and social configurations. This idea allowed for a critique of sociological theory, such as that explored by Berger and Pullberg (1965), namely, that theoretical reifications in sociological discourse had their foundations in the reified concepts of world and self found in everyday life and carried over into sociological discourse. This idea—that realities lived by actors and conceived by theorists were continuous—also meant that sociology and everyday life were vitally and essentially linked. For the concepts and theories of social science were to be interpreted and assessed within the framework of a theory of the "natural attitude." The sociology of knowledge was no longer an optional specialty for theorists, for it provided the catalog of operations required for any account of the processes through which groups of human beings construct worlds of meaning. This is the legacy "this little book" gave to twentieth-century sociology. It provided a theory of the foundations of knowledge in everyday life, and it asked us to use it to assess the quality of sociological knowledge.

Reference
Assigned in 1968 as a teaching assistant in introductory sociology, I was also blessedly assigned to encounter Berger and Luckmann's *Social Construction of Reality*. The freshmen and sophomores I helped guide through social constructionism were also reading four or five other volumes for their introductory course. More than twenty years later, I am guiding other students through Berger and Luckmann's treatise on the sociology of knowledge, but they are mostly seniors studying contemporary sociological theory. Today I would hesitate to walk my freshmen and sophomores through the same volume their peers studied with considerable success a generation ago.

Classic volumes like Berger and Luckmann's thus serve as weather vanes indicating where the winds of educational change might be taking us. Today my students are less comfortable with and attuned to the written word; abstract thought more discernibly intimidates them; "foreign" and technical words raise their suspicions; the subtle practicalities of theoretical sophistication often lie beyond their highly schooled but poorly educated imaginations. Thus, each time I renew my acquaintance with *Social Construction*, I see anew the many faces that have increasingly registered perplexity while grappling with that text.

Symptomatically, even while we teaching assistants were introducing undergraduates to Berger and Luckmann's work, our graduate professors were inculcating the "standing" perspectives associated back then with the "Parsonian synthesis," Homan's behaviorism, and Mead's social pragmatism. By 1977 I was applying for an NEH Summer Seminar on phenomenology and existentialism that Maurice Natanson was offering at Yale, mostly because I felt theoretically stymied whenever I tried to use the perspectives inculcated during my graduate-school days. That summer I discovered the perspective that has since served me in innumerable, perhaps unutterable (that is, meta-theoretical), ways. Then and only then did I find out what Berger and Luckmann had masterminded in *Social Construction* --a theoretical framework that does, as they claim, transcend the Durkheimian and Weberian perspectives on social life while offering a philosophically rigorous foundation for theorizing sociologically. Time and again since then, my experiences have confirmed that their treatise offers sure-footed access to the most oblique and consequential of social realities.

Yet theoretical tokenism continues, limiting the impact of Berger and Luckmann's contribution. My perception is that for most sociologists and some theorists "social constructionism" often serves as little more than a theoretical shibboleth accompanied by a few flat propositions about how people "construct" their identities, worldviews, and taken-for-granted ways of managing their affairs. Over the past twenty years many papers and monographs have involved token nods at social constructionism followed by ahistorical, philosophically naive analyses of the matters at hand. Granted, those who resist such theoretical tokenism have dramatized the pervasive applicability and theoretical rigor of Berger and Luckmann's perspective. I think of such works as *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality* (1978), where Gaye Tuchman shows how available technologies, organizational structures, and social-spatial locations constrain journalists as they socially construct the mass-media reality known as "news," which its consumers in turn put to use as they construct and reconstruct their own shared worlds. Large groupings of social and behavioral scientists, particularly many gender scholars and feminist scholars of science, have also put social constructionism to incisive use. In the end, though, such works may be no more that glorious exceptions to the rule of theoretical tokenism.

A few years ago, James Hunter and Stephen Aïnlay edited and contributed to *Making Sense of Modern Times: Peter L. Berger and the Vision of Interpretive Sociology* (1986). In its epilogue Berger noted, "Of all the books I wrote or coauthored during the earlier part of my career, this is the one that I would change least if I were to revise it today (and I know that Luckmann feels the same way)... It seemed to us then that we were putting together a conceptual tool that would have wide applicability" (1986: 222). He goes on to observe that sociology may be "more of a perspective than a specific field," a perspective that "has enormously influenced...the human sciences, indeed has become an important ingredient of modern thought as such." For me and many others who came of professional age after the publication of *The Social Construction of Reality*, Berger and Luckmann's framework is justifiably characterized in the very terms Berger applies to sociology.

I urge renewed attention to the subtitle and key propositions of Berger and Luckmann's work. It does, after all, concern the sociology of knowledge; its propositions concern legitimation, reification, conceptual machineries, collective sedimentations, and much else that falls by the wayside in many sociological reports purportedly applying its perspective. Reexamining this masterpiece with these and closely related matters in mind will enlarge our theoretical options while reminding us that the sociology of knowledge, informed by phenomenology and shaped in response to our predecessors' ideas, lies at or near the core of virtually every topic that concerns us. The sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann taught us, not only informs the most imaginative varieties of sociological consciousness, but also illuminates the extra-sociological consciousness we can never banish entirely from our texts or our classrooms.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IN CONTEXT

Thomas S. Eberle
Soziologisches Seminar der Hochschule St. Gallen Switzerland

The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann is one of the most cited sociological books of the past twenty-five years. Its title is, undoubtedly, one of their outstanding achievements. Its contents, however, while brilliantly written, have possibly never been really understood. Some have said, rather maliciously, that the book sold so well because many engineers (misanthropically) bought it. Unfortunately, I may add, of the many sociologists who bought or cited the book only a few have studied it.

The book was published in German at S. Fischer in 1970, opening the new series "Conditio Humana," and was introduced by the great Helmut Plessner. Interestingly enough, it was not reviewed by the renowned Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Otherwise it was well-received. Book reviewers commended the new, non-ideological approach, praised the low price, and expressed amazement that an American original was published in German within only three (actually four) years. Although the sociology of knowledge used to be a pet theme of German readers (as Plessner notes in the introduction), Social Construction did not have an easy time of it. When structural functionalism and quantitative sociology--both imported from the United States after World War II--confronted growing criticism in the sixties, the Frankfurt school and neo-Marxism reaped the benefit. Then, after Habermas entered into a well-publicized debate with Niklas Luhmann (who defended a criticism in the sixties, the Frankfurt school and neo-Marxism), the two became the most cited and quoted German sociologists of the period.

Nonetheless, a growing group of sociologists sought a closer and more adequate approach to social reality than these highly-abstract general theories allowed. To these people, Social Construction beckoned the way to symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, socio-linguistics, and other facets of the "interpretive paradigm." This is how I came to study these approaches as a graduate student in the early seventies.

What struck me most were the theses that reality is socially constructed and that sociology has to study the ways in which this is done. The book resurrected Alfred Schutz' phenomenological analysis of the life-world, used it to clarify basic sociological concepts like role and institution, and offered a new synthesis not only of Weber and Durkheim, but also of Mead and philosophical anthropology (Gehlen and Plessner). Berger and Luckmann's explication of the media through which social order is objectified--typification, signs, symbols, habitualization, and so on--rendered deep insights into the richness of human interaction. Their analysis of the relationship between social institutions and the symbolic worlds of meaning (Sinnwelten) which legitimize them proved once and for all that conventional sociological jargon about the "logic of institutions" obscured the actual processes through which institutions become social realities. They presented a sociological theory which conceived of social actors as competent humans, evaded sociological reifications, and abjured the widespread arrogance of social scientists (who at the time loved to talk of "false consciousness" and Freudian "unconscious constraints," properly identified, of course, by themselves). But above all, they made clear how naive an objectivist stance towards social reality is. Put simply: The how of social phenomena has to be explicated before we can attend to the what and the why.

Undoubtedly, the book had its shortcomings. The main one, in my view, was the exclusion of epistemological and methodological discussions (which tactically, I admit, may have been a good move). Why should sociologists care about subjective meaning, given their concern with social actions and social facts? For sake of reliability, should they not limit themselves to external, observable behavior? Schutz agreed that methodological considerations limit the extent and ways in which sociologists can explore subjective experience. Sociological and phenomenological analyses have different purposes even when they focus on the same phenomenon. In Structures of the Life-World, Schutz and Luckmann offer fine-grained descriptions of the formal meaning structures of everyday life. Phenomenologists trust that these structures can be explicated by the reflexive analyses of intentionality. Phenomenological analysis, however, is proto-sociological. Thus a division of labor is struck: The meaning structures of the life-world form, on an epistemological level, a frame in which the hermeneutic task of sociological analysis inevitably has to be pursued. How interpretation is conducted is indeed a methodological question within the finite province of meaning of sociology. But the sociological preoccupation with sociality, understanding and intention arises not from a preference of one "method" over another, but from the intersubjective nature of the lifeworld itself.

Seen from Europe, the portrait of "phenomenological sociology" in American textbooks was often crude caricature. The twenty-fifth anniversary of Social Construction provides the opportunity to redress this impression. If the arguments in the book sometimes seem to be written a little too elegantly, and if you are bothered by the loose definition of some central concepts, you can find detailed specifications in Structures of the Life-World. Even if you are skeptical about the possibility of phenomenological analysis, you will not find another book which explicates human experience, knowledge and action, and the interrelatedness of subjective and intersubjective knowledge in richer detail. If you consider that a discipline like cognitive anthropology moved from the linguistic analysis of terms to the investigation of idioms and is now slowly arriving at the notion of cultural knowledge and its complex relation to action, you recognize how far ahead Berger and Luckmann were twenty-five years ago.

What are the prospects for a phenomenologically oriented sociology in Germany today? It is evident that phenomenology has vastly spread in the past two decades. Phenomenological concepts are found throughout the different fields of sociology. The grand theorists Habermas and Luhmann have incorporated phenomenological concepts as central elements. German rational choice theorists are attempting to integrate Schutz’ work on “choosing among projects of action” into their approach as well (e.g. Hartmut Esser). As for the institutionalization of phenomenology, two facts are worth
noting: The German Research Foundation recently acquired Schutz' private library for the Schutz Archive at the University of Constance, and the prestigious publisher Suhrkamp at Frankfurt is planning a new, all-inclusive edition of Schutz' writings.

Finally, a lively research tradition is under way. A group of phenomenologically oriented sociologists, favoring empirical analyses of concrete social interaction, publishes regularly at prominent publishers (Suhrkamp, Fink). In analyzing what Berger and Luckmann called the "conversational apparatus" in which a common sense of reality is constructed as an ongoing accomplishment in face-to-face situations, they borrow widely from ethnomethodology, ethnography, conversation analysis, symbolic interactionism, cognitive anthropology, and other specialties. By investigating the processes of reality construction locally and in situ, they complement the general level of analysis in Social Construction and materialize what had been Berger and Luckmann's goal from the outset: to found an empirical sociology of knowledge.

Endnote

RECONSTRUCTION INSTEAD OF CONSTRUCTIVISM:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

Hans-Georg Soeffner
FernUniversität GHS
Translated by Mara Luckmann

It would "certainly not amount to the same thing" had the authors called their book "The Construction of Social Reality" instead of The Social Construction of Reality. Thus begins Helmut Plessner's introduction to the German edition published in 1970. This comment may bear even greater importance today than it did twenty-five years ago.

Then the Parsonian were adjudicating the theoretical debates, while empirical social research, in the guise of mathematized scholasticism, was waxing enthusiastic over ever more artful statistical models. At the same time, in almost all 'western' industrial countries, old social utopias had formed an alliance with a new search for collectively-binding meaning. Some younger (as well as a few older) sociologists submerged themselves in the new movements. A new pillar-of-fire sociology came into being which attempted to show the nations in the desert the true path. And it tried to protect itself from error by acquiring the label 'critical.' For it leaves no room for a sociology that provides meaning and its twin, a sociology that unmasks meaning. The aim is simply the reconstruction of social constructions—the description, interpretation, and understanding of understanding itself in a world which always comes to us pre-theoretical way. The ultimate target of this search for the 'foundations of knowledge in everyday life' was the central object of the social sciences: the constitution of what we call 'the societal,' its phenomena, its structural forms, and its processes of 'implementation' and articulation.

[While Schütz had already assimilated the pragmatist ideas of multiple realities (James) and the multiplicity of perspectives (Dewey, Mead) into his "proto-sociology," Berger and Luckmann transferred this whole project into the sociology of knowledge, giving the theory of institutions a micro-foundation in the process.] The result: a sociology of knowledge from the perspective of constitution-analysis.

This sociology describes the human way of approaching the world, the genesis and transmission as well as the changes in our knowledge of the world from the perspective of subjectivity. It describes the formation of the social 'identity of individuals' within the framework of an imposed 'societization' and a socio-historical apriority. Above all, the intention is to show how our everyday reality and our everyday actions are determined by institutions, products, world views, collective 'mentalities,' behavior patterns, and forms of knowledge. All of these arise from human action, and in turn have a retroactive effect upon human action.

The analysis regards itself as the reconstruction of the social construction of reality. It shows how social worlds are created by their denizens, and the conditions social worlds impose upon them in turn. It is neither the reproduction of a system which processes new 'inputs' according to old-established patterns, nor a demonstration of how the countless cogwheels of a social mechanism intersect. Instead, we are shown how societies produce what they claim to know and thus the 'worlds' they inhabit. Thus equipped, we may turn to the concrete historic materials and forms without speculative filter.

Applying such a method of constitution-analysis is like applying a laxative to all forms of speculation or prophecy. In this respect, Social Construction is a disappointment, in spite of its irrefutable success, to all those who expect sociology to present cosmic blueprints or a 'world-theory' (Luhmann). For it leaves no room for a sociology that provides meaning nor yet for its twin, a sociology that unmasks meaning. The aim is simply the reconstruction of social constructions—the description, interpretation, and understanding of understanding itself in a world which always comes to us pre-interpreted.

[For a contemporary example of the quest for metaphysical truths in sociology, Soeffner cites "the recently-formed love match" between Niklas Luhmann's systems theory and "radical constructionism," while partially exempting Karin Knorr-Cetina's "solid empirical reconstructions of constructions."] This colorful congregation meets under the sign of the trinity of 'system, construction, and auto-poiesis'--a unity which can only be held together with the greatest of
would obviously take teams of sociologists several generations of genre analysis: to reconstruct socially constructed and hence of a society's 'communicative budget' illustrates the purpose of contents. One identifies a concrete 'genre' by examining its absurdity. 'Contents' exist exclusively as formed or 'typified' pattern is never mere form. On the contrary, the foolish forms of social knowledge, in particular the 'communicative economic organization, Luckmann is concerned with the world-views. Where as Berger is concerned mainly with political and critical of ideology, and instead with more common-sense approaches which they pursued since then, one can discern the common point of departure and the shared theoretical background. Berger continued to develop the concept of institutions introduced in Social Construction. Pleading for a sociology cleansed of ideological residue, he pursued in a very concrete and empirical way the question of how, in various cultures and contexts, the individual's consciousness is influenced by changes in social organization and institutional structure. In theory, it is more than probable that individuals, interpreting reality in new and different ways, will influence and change institutions in turn. In the past Berger devoted himself to the difficult task of showing concretely how they do this, and how cumulative institutional changes shape everyday life in its most minute aspects, thereby engendering different world-views.

Whereas Berger is concerned mainly with political and economic organization, Luckmann is concerned with the forms of social knowledge, in particular the 'communicative genres' with whose help societies present their knowledge, work on it, store it, and pass it on. A genre qua representational pattern is never mere form. On the contrary, the foolish separation of form and content is revealed here in all its absurdity. 'Contents' exist exclusively as formed or 'typified' contents. One identifies a concrete 'genre' by examining its specific manner of processing knowledge. Luckmann's image of a society's 'communicative budget' illustrates the purpose of genre analysis: to reconstruct socially constructed and hence fully formed and available inventories of knowledge. It would obviously take teams of sociologists several generations to complete such an inventory in even a single society. The point of departure for Luckmann and his team is a single one of the social store-rooms, 'reconstructive genres.' These are genres in which we call to mind past events, submit them to various treatments, and clothe them in various appearances.

Certainly, genres as such exist in all societies and cultures. But each has at its disposal different repertoires, types, and variants of genres. The genre is a universal device for the treatment and storage of knowledge. With regard to the practical work of a material sociology of knowledge and 'science of reality' on the other hand, the aim is simply to trace the genres in their concretization, in other words, to develop a historically oriented theory and methodology.

Luckmann's work has progressed to the point where its effects extend beyond the realm of sociology. One cannot imagine a discussion of hermeneutic devices in general and sociological hermeneutics in specific without the concept of 'communicative genres.' In this concept of representational forms, Luckmann is continuing Schütz' project of mapping the 'structures of the life-world.'

Yet one can also find here a badly overlooked theme, even in the sociology of religion, a theme which both consolidates his early work on the 'invisible religion' and casts it in a new light: the problem of transcendence. Exploring the question on 'this side' of metaphysics, Luckmann analyzes the 'border-crossings' demanded from us as subjects in our perpetual striving to gain access to that which we are not (objects, fellow humans, spatial and temporal 'surroundings,' etc.). The 'ex-centric positionality' (Flessner) characteristic of humankind, the contradictory unity every one of us possesses in that we are both individual and social beings at once, also determines our relative-natural understanding of our own borders and those of the world. Each individual steps outside of himself by interpreting and acting, thus transcending himself, especially when communicating with others. Herein lies the 'origin' of our innerworldly experience of transcendence.

Thus Luckmann demonstrates that neither a theory of the absolute ('being' or 'nothing') nor an other-worldly God is required to account for the experience of transcendence, but simply the individual acting in his life-world. Other, more intense experiences of transcendence are not merely derived from those 'original' ones. They glean their strength and relevance from the soil of the very life-world which they profess to leave behind. This approach might encourage us to regard the problem of religiosity in a manner less speculative and critical of ideology, and instead with more common-sense and care.

As for assessing the effects and consequences of twenty-five years of Social Construction, it is only honest to concede, in retrospect, that it is Berger and Luckmann who have benefited most from it. Other recipients—myself included—shall yet not lose heart.

Endnote

1 This is an abridged and edited version of the original eleven-page essay. Deleted material is summarized in brackets. Although the author approved this version, many qualifications and distinctions have been expunged. Copies of the original (in English and German) are available through the editor. Or contact Professor Hans-Georg Soeffner, FernUniversität GHS, Postfach 940, Rathausstrasse 2, 5800 Hagen, Germany.—ed.
WHAT'S REAL AFTER ALL THESE YEARS?

Charles Lemert
Wesleyan University

According to left-liberal lore, the truly revolutionary book for young sociologists entering academic life in the early 1970s was Alvin Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. I, for one, believed this to be true. Yet, this opportunity to reflect on Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* has forced me to reconsider received wisdom.

My copy of *Social Construction* contains notes reminding me that I had already read the book carefully at least twice before Gouldner's had been published. By 1970 I was completing what I now consider a somewhat goofy doctoral thesis that attempted to "use" constructionist ideas to study suburban culture. Members of my examining committee were so befuddled by that document that, I always believed, they could not find an honest way to vote it down. Such was the power of Berger and Luckmann, if not of the early Lemert. On my first job I taught nothing that did not involve something from Berger and Luckmann. I doubt I was the only struggling left-liberal veteran of the '60s who turned to this book to make sense of life and sociology. Gouldner did become a major influence on my thinking, but later. Others too, perhaps.

Sometime in the mid-'70s, I lost contact with Berger and Luckmann. Luckmann's lectures at Harvard Divinity School had been a high point of my graduate school experience. He was, for me, the first to inspire an interest in language. But, about that time I went to Paris and started reading another tradition of language studies. For whatever reason I just lost contact with Luckmann's work. Berger, on the other hand, was hard to avoid. He was always news. But whenever I looked in on Berger's stuff I could never figure out what happened to me or him. How could the writer who had inspired so much curiosity about constructionism is again provoked. People here, especially the hordes of visiting lecturers, seem to talk as though "constructionism" and "deconstructionism" are virtually the same thing. I may have forgotten a lot about "constructionism," but "deconstructionism" I know, and they are at least as different as Quayle and Kennedy. The ironic, and misunderstood, difference is that "deconstructionism" doubts the world and believes reality, while "constructionism" believes the world and doubts reality.

I admit, as one must, that *Social Construction* did not intend to destroy reality so much as to redefine our social knowledge of it. The book begins: "It will be enough, for our purposes, to define 'reality' as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition... and to define 'knowledge' as the certainty that phenomena are real..." Everything followed from these, now precious, distinctions. *Social Construction* brilliantly introduced many to a completely different reading of Durkheim, Weber, Schutz, Hegel, Marx, Mead and much else. The objective reality of society was rendered in an elegant style that made Durkheim more human in part by bringing him into a good relation with Weber. Both, I thought, were the better for it. Then, the subjective reality of society was told--through the voices of Schutz, Schutz's Weber, Mead and even Goffman--as the other side of what we know objectively. To this day, I cannot think of a single book that presents with such exquisite parsimony so many different ideas so well.

Yet, it is now obvious, the position Berger and Luckmann described relies too much on the uncertain premises of classic, liberal hope, on modernity's dream. Any social "reality," like Berger and Luckmann's, dependent for its certitude on the phenomenology of human knowledge, required a prior, if silent, condition. *Social Construction* made deep sense only if one believed that the world itself was trustworthy enough to support a natural attitude in which social members could take that world for granted. Their constructed reality assumed a world safe from ultimate doubt. The book ended expressing "wonder at [the] astonishing phenomenon" of "society as part of a human world, made by men, inhabited by men, and, in turn, making men, in an ongoing historical process" (1967: 189). Such faith, such a reality, was not long for this world.

In 1967, when *Social Construction* first appeared, the locus classicus of what is now more or less accurately called "deconstructionism" was also published in France. In *Of Grammatology*, Jacques Derrida attacked the very "man" in whom Berger and Luckmann vested so much confidence. Grammatology, he said, "ought not be one of the sciences of man", because it asks first, as its characteristic question, the question of the name of man" (1976 [1967]: 83). The year before, 1966, Foucault too began his most explicit frontal attack on humanism and the human sciences in *The Order of Things*. Foucault confused more than a few liberals, myself included, with statements like "Man is not himself historical" (1970 [1966]: 369) and "Man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for man" (1970 [1966]: 386). From these first declarations emerged what today is called the critique of Eurocentrism.

The term "deconstructionism" has come to have so many
uncertain meanings in the public eye that one could well question its value. It does not, for example, apply very strictly to Foucault, and perhaps not even to Derrida. Just the same, it does describe a definite attitude toward world reality. Deconstructionism might provisionally be described as: a skepticism directed at the reality of the world as such and, thus, at our knowledge of it; plus an ironic faith in the necessity of struggling to know what cannot be known. Deconstructionism might be said to be a perverse knowledge of the unrepresentable untruths of the Truth of the world.

Derrida and Foucault, just as familiar with European social thought (including especially its phenomenological traditions), read Nietzsche to very different effect than did Berger and Luckmann. The constructionists ultimately rested their case on a modernist line of equivocation, from Hegel to Husserl to Weber and Schutz. Deconstructionists turned away from modernist hope to the darker, more convoluted, skepticism wrought by Nietzsche. This made the difference in its way of thinking the real: Whatever is, socially speaking, is nothing in itself; nevertheless, it is real for the odd reason that we can, and do, say it. This is why Derrida and Foucault considered their activities in the early years some new brand of positive knowledge. Derrida, in one of his 1967 essays, described grammatology as a positive science. Weird, perhaps, but true.

How could constructionism have seemed so revolutionary? Why is it still thought of this way by people who otherwise are not likely to share the more classically liberal, thus conservative, views Berger came to hold? The answer to both questions is the same. Constructionism in the 1960s opened the world just as (1967: 47). But what was that world, thus opened? Did it encourage the naive attitude, and taken-for-granted faith, required for such a world to be knowable, known, hence real? To many then coming into truly powerful knowledge of the world, the answer was no. Man's world, being part of the problem, could not be the solution. That world could hardly certify reality. Constructionism, thus, had its powerful effect because it did indeed open eyes to the arbitrariness of social reality. But once one saw the world for what it was, a new set of questions arose. That reality had to be taken seriously. The naive attitude was not enough.

How does one know an arbitrary world one supposes to be guilty of undermining the very reality it pretends to certify? The answer came to be: Only by speaking back, thus taking language seriously as power, and knowledge seriously as the necessity of struggling to know what cannot be known. Deconstructionism might be said to be a perverse knowledge of the unrepresentable untruths of the Truth of the world.

The Social Construction of Reality was a core work in the movement to bring variations in meaning back into sociological analysis. After a period in which meaning was given a narrow role--restricted to some variation in general values or sentiments, or to some normative structures--Berger and Luckmann's treatment of basic social units and identities, as well as interactions and exchanges, as constructed out of cultural meaning was a major contribution. The broadly neo-institutionalist effort that I have been associated with evolves from this starting point.1

Institutionalism moved in a distinct direction in working out the original ideas, of course, in ways that may usefully be spelled out.

1. Berger and Luckmann tend to treat the cultural construction of identity and activity as going on in the same people and groups whose identities and activities are under study, and as going on in the same time frame: The same people are behaving and interpreting at the same time in the same broad social process. Current institutionalist thinking suggests that modern cultural construction processes unfold over larger arenas and longer historical periods. Thus a wider world-cultural system shapes particular national identities and policies; broad sweeps of cultural rationalization precipitate isomorphic forms in particular organizations; and selves reflect the constitution of individual identity in nation-states and other great institutions. Activity in a particular university does little to reconstruct or modify the great meanings of phenomena like "student," "university," "professor," "science," or "sociology." But the great meanings, and their variations over time and setting, strongly impact on activity. The simplification involved has costs, but considerable theoretical and methodological advantages, too.

2. Specialized processes (e.g., the professions or the state) are likely to be involved in the building up of meaning systems. Considerable histories are involved as well. Both constrain the otherwise infinite variability in socially constructed meaning. For instance, practically all nation-states define (remarkably homogeneous) citizenship identities, and root themselves in these. There is variability in these abstractions, but less than one might expect from the diversity of powers and interests in the world. Historical constraints arise from power and resources, but also from earlier cultural meanings and from the constraints of cultural coherence and consistency. The availability of citizenship identities and their fit with other aspects of the modern ideological system make it easier to reconstruct earlier diversities (e.g., of race, ethnicity, gender or age) in standard modern terms.

3. Historical, exogenous, and consistency constraints on meaning routinely create inconsistencies between identity and behavior, and between differing levels of identity. Berger and Luckmann, thinking of behaving persons (or other units) as simultaneously involved in interpretation, tend to treat
inconsistencies as destabilizing and stressful. In modern institutionalist thought (as with "decoupling" in organization theory), inconsistency is essential—it is how great meanings can support and sustain the actual diversity obtaining in local social life and action. "Sociology" arose in close conjunction with the scientific method, and our departments routinely provide instruction in such methods as legitimating strategies. The inevitable practical diversity or vacuity in actual instruction may generate little stress, while a breakdown in legitimacy might be ruinous.

4. In retrospect, Berger and Luckmann give a curiously limited independent role to meaning, and often treat it as arising from functional considerations in practical human activity. Contemporary institutionalist thought leaves open the possibility that modern society is even more culture-ridden. Modern society may be as much the enactment of rationalistic dream-worlds as it is the groping attempt of humans in the real world to interpret and stabilize their reality.

Obviously, other lines of thought stemming from Social Construction moved in different directions from those sketched above. That, I think, indicates the success of the book.

Endnote