Relations between administration and politics

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Introduction

Relations between those who govern (today the politicians) and the administration have always been fraught with tension. This is illustrated by history: the ideal was always a body of officials who sacrificed themselves for the prince and his goals, who took a back seat and thus limited themselves to what is now called policy implementation. Already in the High Middle Ages, however, a dynamism evolved between “being something” (the nobility) and “being able to do something” (ministry officials and other officials), which could also be observed at later stages: whereas the nobility degenerated and often exercised an unreliable government, the officials’ influence increased thanks to their ability and knowledge (Hattenhauer 1993: 9, 112 f.), which in turn increased the governing people’s dependence on the officials.

Various approaches were applied to retain political control of the administration. A famous example is Frederick William of Prussia, who effectively militarised his administration (but also the nobility) by introducing a strict hierarchy in conjunction with a military ethos.

Nowadays the focus has shifted. The actors are no longer the nobility versus officials but democratically elected politicians versus staff employed by the state. In earlier
times, officials enjoyed a great many privileges, which they earned through their special loyalty to those who governed. It is not all that long ago that officials were compelled by law to refrain from doing anything that might be harmful to the state and its reputation – including strikes, demonstrations and conspicuous behaviour. Today, conditions have become similar to those in the private sector, at least in Switzerland. Many privileges, such as employment contracts that were virtually non-terminable, have disappeared, as have the special loyalty obligations. According to present-day perception, state employees’ main motivation no longer arises from service to the state but from the exercise of meaningful functions.

The political/administrative system and with it the political culture in a country exerts an essential influence on the interaction between administration and politics. Where Anglo-American systems try to draw a clear dividing line between administration and politics, the borders are very permeable in Europe’s Latin countries. Whereas in Germany, for instance, compliance with formal precepts is accorded the highest priority and the administration continues to be dominated by lawyers, the Scandinavian countries present themselves as pragmatic systems where the administration and politics are interlinked structures that chiefly take their bearings from effective problem solutions.

All in all, Switzerland is also regarded as a country with a pragmatic culture, which also strives towards harmonious solutions and has therefore developed a great capacity for compromise. This is bound to be reflected in relations between administration and politics, and it is a fact that as a rule, the two systems cooperate in a practical and solution-oriented way. The result is an administration which in an international comparison may be considered to be above-average efficient.

Relations between administration and politics

Relations between administration and politics are often described in the context of the political process. Typically, a distinction is made between the two stages of policy-making and policy implementation, in which the administration may play a more or less active part.

Policy-making includes an analysis of conditions and changes in society that may lead to political activity in certain circumstances. If there are majorities for an activity, then goals will be formulated and a legal basis will be created for this activity. Policy implementation consists of those measures which are taken in order to attain the given goals. They end in outputs for the benefit of stakeholders in society, which ultimately are intended to trigger off the desired outcomes.
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As we will see later, classic approaches assume that public administration has a pure function of policy implementation: independently of the administration, politics prescribes the goals which the administration will have to attain in purely technical terms. This ideal of an administration’s complete impartiality is still accorded a high value in many countries. The city manager models (Stillman 1974) in the Anglo-American area, for example, are based on a clear division of roles: a political council defines the goals which the administration will have to attain, and the city manager implements these goals with his administration. When in 1993, the Bertelsmann Foundation was looking for the world’s best-run city in a kind of competition, two cities with city manager models occupied joint first place: Christchurch, New Zealand, and Phoenix, Arizona (Bertelsmann Stiftung 1993). However, the result says less about the actual management quality in the cities than about the criteria that were applied. A separation of politics and management was obviously considered to be superior to other models at the time.

More recent administration research assumes that the administration has such a wide scope for discretion in the implementation of political goals that it has to make its own decisions as regards its course of action time and again. Thus the administration makes its own policies within the limits of its possibilities even if it is independent of any political parties. The so-called implementation research (Mayntz 1980) is full of such examples. A prominent one is Lipsky’s (1980) street-level bureaucracy theory, which explains why in certain situations, employees of the administration flout the precepts of politics and public management and pursue goals of their own: namely (a) the goals are unclear or difficult to measure, (b) a scarcity of resources prevents them from pursuing their own goals and the prescribed ones simultaneously and (c) the administration’s target groups (clients) exert a great deal of pressure on the employees.

Thanks to its well-founded technical knowledge, however, the administration also has an essential influence at the stage of policy-making, for instance by
(a) unofficially initiating or even pre-formulating parliamentary motions,
(b) commenting on political initiatives,
(c) playing the leading part in the drafting of legal texts, and
(d) exerting an influence on the preparation of the annual budget bill.

There is also an extensive literature about the role of the administration in policy-making (cf. Lienhard 2003: 406). The often intricate and opaque processes that arise through the involvement of a great number of political and administrative actors in the
political process aggravate systematic policy-making. Therefore clear, unequivocal goals are rather rare, and the exploitation of opportunities tends to be the rule. Lindblom (1959) describes this as “muddling through”, an activity in which both the administration and politics are involved.

One outstanding role in the analysis of relations between politics and administration is today played by the economically motivated principal/agent theory. It is included in the frequently quoted cornerstones of New Public Management (Hood 1991: 5 ff.) and assumes that politics as the “principal” concludes agreements with the administration as the “agent” about the services to be provided (note the conceptual congruence with the city manager model). In this case the administration has an information advantage in comparison with politics – at least during the implementation stage – but does not necessarily pursue the same interests. This can result in a moral challenge for the administration to give the interests of politics priority over their own. The medicine for this reads like an inventory of NPM instruments: result measurements, reporting systems, rating systems and accreditation systems and similar measures are intended to reduce the information disadvantage of politics, and incentives such as bonus/malus models, incentive agreements, performance-linked pay, etc., are intended to bring the administration’s interests into line with those of politics. In this way, NPM severs the informal (opaque) ties between administration and politics but compensates for this with formalised reporting and incentive systems (Schedler and Proeller 2000: 83 ff.).

The dichotomy discussion
The discussion about relations between politics and administration has a long history in the literature. Its origins include contributions by Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson, whose article on “The Study of Administration” (1887) established him as the founder of administration science in the US (Waldo 1955: 20). Interactions between administration and politics have been the subject of numerous scientific debates and empirical investigations ever since. One of the questions that has been examined is whether and to what extent officials should be actively involved in the political process.

For a long time, administration sciences were dominated by Weber’s view that a strict separation had to exist between administration and politics in the form of a dichotomy (Fry and Nigro 1996: 37; Jacobsen 2006). According to Weber, the competencies of the administration must be limited in order to counter the administration’s undermining of constitutionality and arbitrary exercise of power. Similarly to Weber, Wilson dealt with the question as to whether and how a dichotomy should exist between administration and politics: In his article, which was published in 1887, Wilson emphasised: “Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (Wilson 1887: 210). However, Wil-
son’s notion of the dichotomy concept differed from Weber’s at least in parts, which finds expression in the following quotation: “Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law […] but the general laws […] are obviously outside and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative” (Wilson 1887: 212). Owing to the fact that administration employees therefore play an important part in policy implementation, they must not merely be regarded as passive instruments of politics. Wilson thus granted the administration a certain measure of decision-making discretion in the exercise of the activities assigned to it (Fry and Nigro 1996: 40).

In the USA, the dichotomy model predominated primarily in the 1920s and 1930s (Svara 1998: 52). In the 1940s, the traditional dichotomy model was increasingly cast into doubt and then treated as an old world view by the authors. Critics such as Friedrich (1940) and, later, Simon (1965) emphasised, in particular, that a consistent separation between administration and politics was not feasible in practice (Jacobsen 2006: 303). Friedrich commented: “The concrete patterns of public policy formation and execution reveal that politics and administration are not two mutually exclusive boxes, or absolute distinctions, but that they are two closely linked aspects of the same process” (1940: 6). He held the view that officials should be given an active role in the political process because their skills and professionalism would guarantee policies tailored to the requirements of the general public.

Further criticism was raised by the adherents of a politically pluralist perspective, who were also of the opinion that administration employees should be involved in the political process (Fry and Nigro 1996: 43). In contrast to Friedrich, however, their arguments did not refer to the professional skills of the administration. Rather, they regarded administration employees as further stakeholders, who should therefore also be able to participate in political processes. In spite of this many-faceted criticism and the fact that an interaction between administration and politics had been scientifically proved on several occasions, the dichotomy model did not completely disappear as an approach to an explanation of relations between politics and administration. On the basis of numerous different interpretations and developments, various versions of the concept have emerged instead (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 32).

**The structural perspective**

Today, relations between administration and politics are viewed in a differentiated light. They are characterised by various structural factors. In a much-noted internationally comparative study of administration reforms, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: 50 ff.) choose “minister-mandarin relations” as a characteristic trait of a political-
administrative system. They select two distinguishing features for relations between ministers and mandarins (officials):

- **degree of integration**: this indicates the strength of the integration of the ministers’ and officials’ careers. The authors’ thesis states that reforms are easier to implement in integrated systems since both groups have a comparable education/training background and incentive systems;

- **degree of politicisation**: this indicates the strength of the politicisation of leading administrative positions. The authors’ thesis states that reforms are easier to implement in more highly politicised systems since politicians and senior officials are more likely to be in agreement. However, a lower degree of politicisation tends to lead to a more stable situation.

In Pollitt and Bouckaert’s view, the function (position) of leading administration employees is political to a certain extent even when the careers of politicians and senior officials run separate courses, as is the case in Switzerland, for example. In Switzerland, the administration is often able to intervene in the political process thanks to the relatively high scope for discretion in the exercise of its functions. Added to this, an increase in the functions of the state makes parliament increasingly dependent on the government, whilst the government, in turn, is increasingly dependent on the administration (Mastronardi 1998: 66).

### The interdependence between administration and politics

In a study, Jacobsen (2006: 304 ff.) examines the question as to the extent to which relations between administration and politics are not only influenced by structural variables – similar to the “minister-mandarin relations” described by Pollitt and Bouckaert – but also by situative factors such as the size of the administrative unit and personal characteristics such as experience. He examines the interaction between the two spheres at a local level. Contrary to a great number of studies which treat relations between administration and politics as a constant, Jacobsen regards these relations as a variable which depends on a variety of factors.

However, the results of the study confirm the findings of other studies according to which the interaction between politicians and administration employees primarily depends on the individual actors’ hierarchical position within the formal structure (Jacobsen 2006: 317). An interaction between politics and administration primarily takes place between leading politicians (members of the executive) and senior administrative staff (Mouritzen and Svara 2002: 224 ff.; Schedler 2008: 170 ff.). In comparison, there is relatively little contact between simple deputies/members of parliament and officials. This means that situative factors and personal characteristics are of secondary im-
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Importance and exert only a temporary influence on relations between administration and politics.

Moreover, according to Jacobsen the interaction is crucially shaped by a dynamically structural component. Thus interactions between politicians and officials are more intense the further the last elections (and the campaign to go with them) are in the past. The reason for this is that elections constitute a kind of shock for both sides (politics and administration) which must first be individually overcome and dealt with. After an election, politicians are initially usually engaged in the configuration of the political process (for instance, forging alliances) and will only be able to turn to the administration and its employees after a certain time (Jacobsen 2006: 317). At the same time, the administration will limit its activities during the election campaign and postpone politically delicate matters. Thus it takes a certain amount of time for interaction to resume. The knowledge and experience deficits from which politicians may suffer at the outset of their term of office will decrease continually in the course of time and owing to a nascent learning process, and these deficits increasingly lose their significance with regard to politicians’ interactions with the administration. Relations between politics and administration begin to be formalised and centralised after a certain time. Jacobsen (2006: 318) considers this to be an indication that the actors learn inside the system how they have to behave correctly according to the formal and informal rules.

By way of an alternative to the dichotomy concept outlined above, Svara bases his analysis of relations with administration on the complementary model, which implicitly has always existed. This model assumes that politicians and administration employees meet in order to control political events together and in a sensible manner (Svara 2001: 179). This implicitly posits an interdependence between the differing roles of politicians and officials. Compliance with rules stands side by side with independence, respect for political control goes hand in hand with the administration’s commitment to advance policy implementation for the benefit of public interest, etc. This perspective is not about assessing whether relations between politicians and the administration are dichotomous or not, but about how both parties contribute towards the political process (Cook 1996: 131). This reflects a changed understanding of the interaction between administration and politics which, in a rudimentary fashion, could already be observed in Wilson’s publications and in essence is based on the recognition of reciprocal and interdependent relations (Svara 2001: 179). This does not mean, however, that administration and politics do not continue to play different roles. Contrary to earlier views, it is assumed, though, that a certain overlap of political and administrative functions is inevitable and even fruitful.

According to Svara (2001: 179), the reciprocal and complementary values that constitute the cornerstone of administration and politics explain why politicians con-
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continue to be able to exercise their control function irrespective of their concessions to the administration.

In Svara’s view, relations between politicians and administration employees can also be regarded as an interplay between the two structural variables of “political control” and “professional independence”. Depending on the distinctive characteristics of these variables, relations between administration and politics are shaped in different ways. If political control is strong and the administration’s independence is weak, the political perspective will predominate. This has serious disadvantages: such a situation can lead to a loss of professional competence on the part of the administration and open the doors to corruption on the politicians’ part. Conversely, if the administration enjoys too much independence and the politicians exercise too little control, this results in so-called “bureaucratic autonomy” and thus to a shift of power away from politics to the administration, which according to the Swiss understanding of these matters would lead to a deficit of democratic control. A strict separation of administration and politics can therefore lead to distorted relations in which one power dominates the other. If both variables are weak, this usually results in laissez-faire conditions.

It must be assumed that relations between administration and politics in western countries are usually based on a certain measure of complementarity and that administration and politics provide each other with mutual support as complementary elements.

The mutual legitimation of administration and politics

One important discussion is being conducted in the contemporary literature about neo-institutional organisational theory. Parsons (1956), an early exponent of what is now called neo-institutional organisational theory, assumed that rational organisation alone is not sufficient for an organisation to be able to survive. One necessary condition is its legitimation by the environment. The organisation acquires this legitimation by fulfilling the environment’s organisational expectations. Thus enterprises have themselves ISO 9000 certified even if this is not of any direct benefit to the organisation. However, the certificate enhances the company’s own legitimacy since it gives the impression that its quality management is state of the art. The same applies to universities: they have themselves accredited by internationally operating profit-oriented organisations and for this purpose undergo a standardisation process which makes it very difficult for them to differentiate themselves from other competing universities. In Switzerland, there is an additional accreditation by the Confederation, whose benefit many researchers have not been able to fathom out to this day. Christensen et al. (2007: 58 ff.) demonstrate that neo-institutionalism has developed its own conceptualisation for the description of this phenomenon. If shared ideas about a “good” organisation evolve in
an institutional environment (for instance in a country’s political-administrative systems) which are then no longer challenged (and thus have become institutionalised), we speak of “myths”. If an organisation meets the requirements of these myths, then it strengthens its legitimacy in the environment.

With regard to relations between politics and administration, this can be translated into two questions:

(1) How can the administration acquire the legitimisation of its most important stakeholder, politics?

(2) How can politics acquire the legitimisation of its most important stakeholder, the administration?

The term “legitimisation” is used in a sociological sense here. It primarily encompasses elements such as acceptance, cooperativeness and support by the environment. This is distinct from the legal term, which is defined more narrowly and formally: the legitimisation of administrative action (exclusively) arises from a legal basis (Mastronardi 2004: 277). By creating this basis, politics legitimise the administration in its action and ultimately in its existence.

Myths are also shaped by the culture that prevails in a political-administrative system. Expectations of the administration are explained in the relations with politics, which are fraught with tensions:

– the balance between loyalty and neutrality (Christensen et al. 2007: 49 f.): the administration is expected to loyally implement the precepts of politics while at the same time being politically neutral itself in order to be able to implement policies of changing political majorities;

– the balance between loyalty and professional norms: the administration is expected to implement political precepts but at the same time make decisions on the basis of sound professional judgement. Simon (1965: 278 ff.) also calls this a conflict between loyalty and organisational identity, with the latter being nurtured by the norms of the profession responsible for the function.

**Different rationality concepts of administration and politics**

Administration and politics pursue different logics of action, i.e. their own respective rationalities. A rationality is a specific form of thinking, speaking and acting, which results in a logical meaning in itself (Schedler 2003). It works as a filter for the perception of the environment and furnishes patterns for the construction of its own reality. For a rationality to survive in a social system (such as administration or politics), it must be confirmed time and again. This is done in processes of rationalisation (Weick 1995: 63), i.e. the members in a system are able to persuade the others (we call them “peers”) that their speech and actions are rational.
In their respective roles, politicians and administration employees largely take over the rationality of their social environment even though they participate in the preservation or modification of this rationality to a certain extent. Schedler and Proeller (2000) describe this as follows: “Politics and management constitute two worlds with different patterns of thought, notions, and sanctioning and rewarding mechanisms. This results in rationalities of thought and action which are different in politics and management. What is politically rational may strike management as irrational. Whereas managers make factual decisions, politicians depend on majorities in order to be able to press home their concerns. Majorities, in turn, are frequently the result of complex negotiation processes in which acceptance and rejection of things are bartered for which are often only tenuously connected with each other. Politics and management are often equally goal-oriented; only their ways towards the goal can be fundamentally different.” (Schedler and Proeller 2000: 53)

In everyday life, then, (at least) two control circuits are in operation practically independently of each other, each following its respective rationality. For politics and administration to be able to communicate and interact with each other at all, an overlap of the two circuits with a translation between the respective rationalities is required (cf. Fig. 19.2). How strongly the two circuits overlap and thus interact depends on each individual political-administrative system.

Table 19.1: The rationalities of politics and administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal success criterion</th>
<th>Rationality of politics</th>
<th>Rationality of the administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majority in formal ballots</td>
<td>Fulfilment of tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical success factors</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>Legality and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bartering processes</td>
<td>Image in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opinion-forming</td>
<td>Efficiency and effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Image in the population</td>
<td>Protection of one’s own scope of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of relevant stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An empirically secured representation of the rationalities of politics and administration does not exist to date – at least as far as we can see. Intuitively, however, the two rationalities can certainly be described (cf. Table 19.1). Accordingly, the rationality of politics is likely to be primarily characterised by the critical success factors which allow for a formation of majorities: the forging of coalitions, underhand bartering processes, opinion-forming, the cultivation of the image of politics in the population and the involvement of relevant stakeholders. This is opposed by the rationality of administration, which takes its bearings from the fulfilment of government tasks as its formal criterion of success and is characterised by the following critical success factors: legality, democratic legitimacy, image in politics (to ensure resource allocation), efficiency and effectiveness (for the creation of organisational legitimacy) and the protection of its own scope of action (which also comprises protection against the arbitrariness of politics).
The quite substantial differences between the rationalities of administration and politics do not make cooperation in a political-administrative system easy. Figure 19.2 shows an ideal-typical situation of control in a political-administrative system in which political objectives are translated into concrete administrative goals. The implementation of these goals can be represented in the form of goal attainment, which will then have to be retranslated into the political rationality (representation of an outcome). The assessment of the outcomes of administrative action is conducted by politicians, who draw their conclusions for new or adapted objectives from them.

**Figure 19.2:** Interaction between the rationalities of politics and administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy-making</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Outcome assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>“Translation”</td>
<td>Outcome representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concretisation of objectives</td>
<td>Management rationality</td>
<td>Goal attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of objectives</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This more or less close interlocking of the two systems of administration and politics makes clear that the dichotomy model described above does not correspond to reality. One system cannot live without the other. Consequently, administration should make great efforts to improve the quality of decisions in politics, for instance by making available information that is relevant to decision-making and tailored to its addressees (cf. Brun 2003). Then again, politicians ought to have a great interest in an efficient and motivated administration which actively supports them in decision-making and implementation. It would appear, however, that sensitivity to the administration as a social system is not a matter of course in politics. Even members of the executive demonstrate a greatly different understanding of their leadership role vis-à-vis the administration, which is usually sharply observed by the latter.

**Administration and politics in Switzerland**

A depiction of relations between administration and politics in Switzerland grapples with the problem of Switzerland’s extremely heterogeneous organisation. The Confederation, the 26 cantons and the now approx. 2,400 municipalities may have similar formal structures (with legislative, executive and administration), but life in these structures is hugely different. The following depiction must therefore certainly be understood as a simplification, as a description of a tendency as differentiated from other systems, as a Swiss average. In this limited space it is neither possible, nor does it make sense, to strive for completeness.
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To begin with it is conspicuous that the system of concordance exercises a great deal of influence on interactions between administration and politics. Since there is no government coalition in Switzerland that faces a strong opposition, the role of parliament as a supervisory organ has developed more strongly than in competitive systems. In practice, the executive and the administration often act in concert, whereas the legislative is conceived of as a more or less predictable organ in which they have to press home their objectives. In this respect, concordance results in executive and administration closing ranks while there is a greater distance between legislative and administration.

This is juxtaposed by the system of collegiality in the executive, which obliges individual members to advocate the decisions made by the body as whole in communication to the outside even if they run counter to their own opinion. This leads to a situation whereby the individual members of the executive often protect each other at the relational level, i.e. they display a higher degree of mutual loyalty than would be expected. At the factual level, they have to make compromises time and again which cannot always be readily understood by their departments (ministries). However, the principle of collegiality in Switzerland is applied in a variety of ways that even include open defiance.

According to the departmental principle, which is widespread in Switzerland, each member of an executive is also responsible for part of the administration (department, ministry, portfolio). As a rule it is assumed that the executive is thus the supreme management body of the administration – not only in political terms but also in organisational terms. The executive therefore has a double function: as a body, it is the organ expected to provide political leadership in the state; as individuals, the members of this body constitute the top management level of the administration. This predestines the executive to take on the translation function between politics and administration. It is supported in this by the departmental secretariats, whose directors frequently have a decidedly strong position in a body politic.

Although relations between the executive and the administration are comparatively close, it is basically assumed that Switzerland’s administration is politically neutral. In most bodies politic, holders of an administrative office are precluded from assuming a political office, and vice versa. However, administration employees are allowed to be members of a political party and to be politically active there. In contrast to the USA, for instance, Switzerland does not have any political officials who are changed over whenever the political leadership changes. One exception is constituted by the Federal Councillor’s personal assistants – a model that hardly exists at lower levels of government. The basic assumption is that the administration remains static when there are switch-overs in the executive. In practice, however, it becomes apparent that there is
often a certain amount of movement in the top echelons of the administration when the political leadership changes.

The system of direct democracy also has a strong impact on relations between administration and politics. The potential necessity of having to ensure that a political business item may have to survive the ballot box forces both sides to communicate in a simple, citizen-oriented manner. A specialisation that often leads to alienation between administration and citizens in the German or French “bureaucratic state” is therefore hardly imaginable in Switzerland. In comparison to other European countries, Switzerland’s administrations are characterised by a pronounced pragmatism, which primarily takes its bearings from an effective fulfilment of functions. Administration employees first conceive of themselves as citizens and “normal” employees of a government organisation rather than as superior representatives of state authority.

This consistent rejection of the formation of an administrative class in Switzerland is traced back by Brändli-Traffelet (2004) to civil liberty, which he deems a Swiss peculiarity. This means that individual citizens’ liberty enjoys priority over other concerns of the state unless an intervention is based on an interest that is particularly worthy of protection. The explanation for this requires a brief change in perspective: a description of citizens’ attitudes towards administration. Swiss people have a marked phobia of excessive government bureaucracy, and they fundamentally mistrust opaque administrative processes. From the point of view of Swiss citizens, administration is an organisation like any other which has to fulfil its functions efficiently and effectively. This puts administration and politics under pressure to find solutions for the provision of public services that are as lean as possible in organisational terms – even if in reality, quite a few inefficiencies can still be found.

As in many other countries, relations between administration and politics were fundamentally called into question in Switzerland with the arrival of NPM. The Swiss variant of NPM, Outcome-Oriented Public Management (Buschor 1993), attempted to replace the hierarchical subjection and factual blurring of functions by a more strongly formalised package consisting of performance agreements, performance measurement and one-line budgets. In this way, control was intended to accord more weight to the output and outcome aspect of the political process (cf. Fig. 19.1). It appears that Outcome-Oriented Public Management was able to achieve a distinct change in administrative culture in Switzerland, as evaluations demonstrated (cf. Rieder and Lehmann 2002: 25 ff.; Lienhard et al. 2005). In this context, it was close cooperation between elites in politics and administration that had an essential impact on the successful implementation of Outcome-Oriented Public Management (Schedler 2008: 165 ff.) – but it also worked the other way round: where such cooperation between legislative, executive and administration failed, Outcome-Oriented Public Management was usually also doomed to failure.
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Relations between administration and politics can be analysed from different disciplinary perspectives. Traditionally, the legal sciences predominated in administration science, with political sciences being the second leading discipline. New Public Management suddenly brought business economics into play, which increased the complexity of the academic debate. Today’s challenge is the initiation of fair and open interactions between the disciplines (Mastronardi 2004). Each discipline offers an important perspective without being able to claim that it is of any higher value than the others. This may well be the guiding principle for a scientific penetration of relations between administration and politics.

Literature


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