| Item Type |
Journal paper
|
| Abstract |
The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest. |
| Authors |
Kolmar, Martin & Wagener, Andreas |
| Journal or Publication Title |
Southern Economic Journal |
| Language |
English |
| Subjects |
economics |
| HSG Classification |
contribution to scientific community |
| Refereed |
Yes |
| Date |
July 2012 |
| Publisher |
Southern Economic Association |
| Place of Publication |
Stillwater, Okla. |
| Volume |
79 |
| Number |
1 |
| Page Range |
161-179 |
| Number of Pages |
19 |
| ISSN |
0038-4038 |
| Publisher DOI |
https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.161 |
| Depositing User |
Prof. Dr. Martin Kolmar
|
| Date Deposited |
17 Jun 2013 11:15 |
| Last Modified |
20 Jul 2022 17:16 |
| URI: |
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/223614 |
Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods
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