Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.
Authors Kolmar, Martin & Wagener, Andreas
Journal or Publication Title Southern Economic Journal
Language English
Subjects economics
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
Refereed Yes
Date July 2012
Publisher Southern Economic Association
Place of Publication Stillwater, Okla.
Volume 79
Number 1
Page Range 161-179
Number of Pages 19
ISSN 0038-4038
Publisher DOI
Depositing User Prof. Dr. Martin Kolmar
Date Deposited 17 Jun 2013 11:15
Last Modified 20 Jul 2022 17:16



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Kolmar, Martin & Wagener, Andreas (2012) Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods. Southern Economic Journal, 79 (1). 161-179. ISSN 0038-4038

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