Opposition to Immigration across Welfare State Regimes
A large-N fsQCA

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1. Approaches to opposition towards Immigration
2. Analysis
3. Conclusion
Self-Interest Theory

- Specific Economic Threat
- Diffuse Economic Threat
- Competition over Benefits
- Non-economic Consequences

Identity Theory

- Cultural Unity
- National Authority
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low Education (EDUC)</th>
<th>in-group framing (INF)</th>
<th>Low Social Trust (NTR)</th>
<th>No Immigrant Friends (NOFR)</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Area (HET)</th>
<th>Spec. Economic Threat (SPEC)</th>
<th>Unemployment (UNEM)</th>
<th>No For. Background (FORB)</th>
<th>Solution Coverage</th>
<th>Solution Consistency</th>
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Cumulative:

- Presence: 7 7 2 8 3 4 0 0
- Absence: 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0
- Not part: 1 1 4 0 3 3 8 8
Conclusion

1. Findings support previous research; however, the interaction hypothesis should receive more attention in future research

2. Factor analysis questions the clear distinction between self-interest and identity theories

3. FsQCA has specific advantages for survey data
Likert-Scale

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Fuzzy Set

1

0.5

0