Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.
Authors Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Hodler, Roland
Journal or Publication Title European Economic Review
Language English
Subjects economics
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
Refereed Yes
Date 1 May 2010
Publisher Elsevier
Place of Publication Amsterdam
Volume 54
Number 4
Page Range 608-621
Number of Pages 14
ISSN 0014-2921
ISSN-Digital 1873-572X
Publisher DOI
Depositing User Prof. Dr. Roland Hodler
Date Deposited 23 Sep 2014 20:19
Last Modified 28 Mar 2023 00:23


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Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Hodler, Roland (2010) Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption. European Economic Review, 54 (4). 608-621. ISSN 0014-2921

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