| Item Type |
Journal paper
|
| Abstract |
We hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development, resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within-country variation in our sample covering the period 1970-2005 and 133 countries. Our results are robust to the use of additional control variables, different samples, and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions. |
| Authors |
Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Hodler, Roland |
| Journal or Publication Title |
World Development |
| Language |
English |
| Keywords |
natural resources; political institutions; financial development |
| Subjects |
economics |
| HSG Classification |
contribution to scientific community |
| Refereed |
Yes |
| Date |
1 May 2014 |
| Publisher |
Elsevier Science |
| Place of Publication |
Amsterdam |
| Volume |
57 |
| Number |
1 |
| Page Range |
101-113 |
| Number of Pages |
13 |
| ISSN |
0305-750X |
| ISSN-Digital |
1873-5991 |
| Publisher DOI |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.003 |
| Depositing User |
Prof. Dr. Roland Hodler
|
| Date Deposited |
24 Sep 2014 08:06 |
| Last Modified |
28 Mar 2023 00:23 |
| URI: |
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/235014 |
Do Natural Resource Revenues Hinder Financial Development? The Role of Political Institutions
