Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Non-Rival Goods
| Item Type | Journal paper |
| Abstract | We analyze the optimal relationship between the public and private enforcement of property rights for the case of rival and nonrival goods. Exclusion is interpreted as a costly activity, which allows it to endogenize the distinctions between public and club goods on the one hand and between private and common-pool goods on the other. We characterize optimality conditions for the private provision of rival and nonrival goods, characterize optimal enforcement policies, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives. |
| Authors | Kolmar, Martin |
| Journal or Publication Title | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) |
| Language | English |
| Subjects | economics |
| HSG Classification | contribution to scientific community |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Date | 1 September 2015 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck |
| Place of Publication | Tübingen |
| Volume | 171 |
| Number | 3 |
| Page Range | 405-431 |
| ISSN | 0932-4569 |
| ISSN-Digital | 1614-0559 |
| Publisher DOI | https://doi.org/10.1628/093245615X14113700937442 |
| Depositing User | Dr. Mirela Keuschnigg |
| Date Deposited | 24 Sep 2014 09:49 |
| Last Modified | 20 Jul 2022 17:21 |
| URI: | https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/235038 |
DownloadFull text not available from this repository.CitationKolmar, Martin (2015) Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Non-Rival Goods. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 171 (3). 405-431. ISSN 0932-4569 Statisticshttps://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/235038
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