near the Gulf and the political obstacles placed in the path of those trying to limit the extent of either Turkish or Persian authority. This boundary dispute is replete with diplomatic undertakings and a great deal of that history is told here.

The legal analysis is cast in terms of “quieting title” to the disputed property of the boundary but also concerns political considerations cast into the mix by both sides. The activities of the two sides after 1975 indicate, in the view of the author, that law and politics are mixed here. Iraq abrogated the 1975 Baghdad Treaty in September 1980 because, it is claimed, it believed that Iran had aided the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq and had attempted to export its Islamic Revolution, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty. Iraq thus claimed that the thalweg border was no longer operative and that Iraq was again the sovereign of the river.

Irrespective of whether Iran had aided and abetted Kurdish rebels, Kaikobad argues that mere abrogation of the Treaty does not destroy the boundary it set because the law does not look favorably on a reexamination of principles of boundary allocation. Historically, the Shatt had been under Turkish (Iraqi) control. Thus, when Iraq and Iran agreed, in 1975, to set a thalweg boundary, that boundary was fixed in law and was final, absent further mutual agreement as to its limits—rather like nature abhorring a vacuum. The Iran-Iraq War reflects politics. In law, the boundary remains as it was in 1975.

In the final aspect of his legal analysis, the author describes the regime of belligerency between Iran and Iraq and judges that neither party can affect the delimitation of the thalweg boundary by virtue of land seized during hostilities. While either or both countries can abrogate the 1975 Treaty, the effect of the Treaty was to fix a boundary and that aspect has been concluded. Were it otherwise, any boundary could be affected in law by the opening of hostilities. Since at the time this book was written the outcome of the war was unknown, the author theorizes that neither party can gain territorial rights and title from the conflict itself, and that when hostilities end, the boundary will remain. He thus poses a legal resolution to the boundary dispute and supports it with his arguments. Perhaps the two sides will heed these arguments in settling their differences.

Kaikobad is a legal scholar. He has crafted a legal analysis of both sides of a controversial issue and has presented carefully balanced opinions about the way the gulf war began and how it can be resolved. I was given a greater appreciation of the complexity of this boundary dispute than I had previously held. Lawyers and diplomats alike can learn from the author’s proposed approach to dispute resolution, and all students of history can appreciate the professional, detailed way he has unraveled a complex legal, historical and political conundrum in the most volatile geographic area of the world.

On August 2, 1990, after this review was written, Iraq invaded Kuwait, as if to highlight the timeliness of Kaikobad’s analysis of Iraq’s territorial dispute with Iran. While the underlying causes of the invasion are doubtless complex, they certainly include Iraq’s desire for control of the Shatt-al-Arab’s exit to the Persian Gulf and the islands that sit in the mouth of the river. There is speculation that a mediated, peaceful resolution of this “crisis in the gulf” would lead to Iraq’s control of Abadan and other islands.

Kaikobad’s desire for the mediated settlement of regional territorial disputes is echoed each day of the crisis. But that hope may be sorely tested as the world is inexorably drawn away from a peaceful “Arab solution” toward an unknown kismet.

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Europe is going through a period of radical change: nothing is like it was only a year
ago, and nothing is like it had been since 1945. Communism has failed; the East European nations turned away from it as soon as they were able to take their fate into their own hands. They turned to the West, its liberal social and economic systems and the prosperity that results. My country has regained its unity after forty-five years, though with the bitter loss of Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia.

In this situation, how can we benefit from two books written in 1988 on West European efforts to achieve greater unity in security and defense policy? No one knows how many of their statements are still up-to-date and how many are useful only for the writer of contemporary history. No one knows what is to become of NATO after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact or what an “all-European security system” ought to look like, either standing in the place of the old alliances or overarching them, but it should assure the political and military integration of a united Germany into Europe as wished by all its neighbors.

The first book under review—edited by Reimund Seidelmann, professor of political science at Giessen University—starts with the demands for the “Europeanization of European security policy,” which got louder from the late seventies on. The phrase is not blurred by accident, since quite different conceptions are introduced under this theme—different according to the respective political, but especially national, positions of the users. What they all hold in common is that Western Europe should gain more military autonomy (within NATO or by means of European institutions like the Western European Union) after its economic and political unification, so as to protect its interests more efficiently. Europeanization is demanded mainly with a view to the United States, the debate always having been given fresh impetus when it seemed that American and West European interests would clash. But a real separation of Western Europe from the United States has never played a part in the discussion.

In his somewhat overlong contribution (pp. 11–101), which dominates the volume, Seidelmann summarizes the various arguments favoring the unity of Western Europe with respect to security policy as follows (p. 19 ff.): Western Europe must Europeanize its security policy to realize its interests within NATO and vis-à-vis third states; Europeanization is necessary to face pacifist and neutralistic tendencies in West Germany and to secure its embedment in the West; and integration within the European Community—which is to be developed into a “European Union” under the Single European Act of February 28, 1986—consequently calls for the inclusion of security and defense policy. Seidelmann points out that the demands for Europeanization have often been mere declarations, specifically made to maintain the status quo (pp. 49 and 55).

The essays in this volume (all by West German authors, but by no means written from a narrow national point of view) give a detailed account of the Europeanization debate; of the great goals and small practical steps on which the states could agree before 1988; of the “European Defense Community,” which was turned down by the French National Assembly in 1954 and today may serve as a historical model; and of the bodies that could offer the institutional framework for Europeanization, viz., the Euro-Group and the Independent European Programme Group within NATO, the Western European Union (Gerner’s essay on this institution is particularly instructive), the EEC and the European Political Cooperation (the forum for the coordination of the foreign policies of the EEC states).

The coexistence of these competing institutions that essentially have the same members is plausible in light of the interests of West European states: this structure maintains the authority of the single states regarding security policy and, at the same time, allows the implementation of those measures of Europeanization regarded as absolutely necessary (p. 96, cf. pp. 72–73 and 131). The reason the number of such measures is small (Seidelmann refers to the exclusion of such crucial fields as military policy, nuclear policy and arms control) can basically be found in the different—partly historically determined—military strategies and defense policies of France, Great Britain and West Germany, which are analyzed.
by Jopp, Meyer, Ropers and Schlotter (pp. 103–38).

“Tendencies of renationalization” in already integrated fields, which are mentioned by the authors (p. 130, cf. pp. 52–53), could increase with the end of the Soviet threat, with a decrease in the U.S. engagement, and especially with the substitution of a necessarily looser all-European security system for existing alliances. Considering that “renationalization” is also taking place in Eastern Europe, and is even stronger there, this development could threaten peace in Europe.

The all-European security system, which is to be institutionalized in (new) bodies of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, clearly differs from previously debated concepts of “common security,” as Pott’s essay (pp. 353–84) illustrates. These concepts—based upon the partition of Europe in opposing (military) blocs—provided the extension of “antagonistic cooperation” (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen) to the field of security, the main reason being that security in the nuclear age could only be organized with a potential enemy, not against it. But a denuclearized, renationalized Europe would constitute a totally different situation, presenting the danger that some states might again regard conventional warfare as possible. History has shown that a common interior order alone, even if it is democratic and constitutional, is no guarantee of peace.

Unfortunately, the volume lacks a detailed table of contents (which would include the various titles of the chapters within the essays), an index and a list of abbreviations. Furthermore, there is no identification of the authors apart from their names.

All West European unity in security policy is dependent on the joining of France and Germany. This aspect, the Franco-German relationship with respect to external security, is dealt with in the contribution of Kiersch and Reuss (pp. 295–321), and also in the second book under review, containing updated papers of a June 1988 colloquy. The editors, André Brigit, Peter Schmidt and Walter Schütze, are on the staff of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (in Ebenhausen near Munich), the Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale and the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (both in Paris), these institutions having organized the colloquy. The book was also released in a French edition.

Based on the history of the Franco-German postwar friendship founded by de Gaulle and Adenauer, authors from the two countries address problems of current German-French cooperation: the different national interests regarding security policy, the existence of French nuclear weapons and the possibility of joint or at least coordinated policies of arms control and East-West relations. Although many of the forecasts of the authors cannot be sustained in the face of the recent changes in Europe, the reader can still develop his or her own ideas of future cooperation, on the basis of the detailed account of past relations offered by the volume. Time will tell whether initiatives taken in the eighties after a long period of stagnation—especially the creation of a Franco-German Council for Defense and Security, and a joint brigade—will be further developed under the new circumstances, and whether agreement can be reached on a joint defense concept including French nuclear weapons and the future place of the United States in Europe.

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When I began my first academic article, a study of United States export controls,1 there was relatively little scholarly literature on which to draw. Since that time—beginning, to my dismay, even before I completed the article—there has been a virtual explosion of writing about economic sanctions. This reflects both a rapid and a sus-