| Item Type |
Monograph
(Working Paper)
|
| Abstract |
Exploiting a unique feature of the Clayton Antitrust Act, we analyze how directors holding outside directorships at peer firms affect firm value and performance of financial firms. We find that directors serving simultaneously at horizontally-related firms have a negative impact on firm value and performance, whereas directors holding outside directorships in vertical industries, i.e., customer or supplier industries, enhance firm value and performance. Our results suggest a tradeoff between director experience and conflicts of interest. Further, stock market reactions provide evidence that investors recognize the value-diminishing effect of horizontal directors as well as the value-increasing effect of vertical directors. |
| Authors |
Schmid, Markus; Berg, Tatjana & Horsch, Philipp |
| Language |
English |
| Keywords |
Governance, Firm value, Financial institutions |
| Subjects |
business studies |
| HSG Classification |
contribution to scientific community |
| Refereed |
No |
| Date |
2015 |
| Series Name |
School of Finance Working Paper Series |
| Number |
2015/07 |
| Depositing User |
Prof. Dr. Markus Schmid
|
| Date Deposited |
05 May 2015 09:25 |
| Last Modified |
20 Jul 2022 17:24 |
| URI: |
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/240874 |
Sharing a Director with a Peer
