Proxy Advisors and Shareholder Dissent: A Cross-Country Comparative Study

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract

Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that enable shareholders to exercise their voting
rights. While proxy advisors’ influence is documented in market-based corporate governance
systems, we know little about the corporate governance role of proxy advice in relationshipbased
governance systems. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance
literature, we theorize that shareholders are sensitive to the costs and benefits of
monitoring by considering internal monitoring capabilities. We also theorize that relative to
market-based corporate governance systems, proxy advice is both less influential and has lower
predictive quality in relationship-based governance systems. We test our multilevel model using
13,497 voting results from 613 firms in 16 Western European countries and generally find support
for our predictions.

Authors Sauerwald, Steve; van Oosterhout, Hans; van Essen, Marc & Peng, Mike
Journal or Publication Title Journal of Management
Language English
Subjects business studies
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area Global Center for Entrepreneurship + Innovation
Refereed Yes
Date 2018
Publisher Sage Publ.
Volume 44
Number 8
Page Range 3364-3394
ISSN 0149-2063
Publisher DOI 10.1177/0149206316675928
Depositing User Prof. Dr. Marc van Essen
Date Deposited 28 Nov 2018 14:25
Last Modified 05 Feb 2020 01:23
URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/255880

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Citation

Sauerwald, Steve; van Oosterhout, Hans; van Essen, Marc & Peng, Mike (2018) Proxy Advisors and Shareholder Dissent: A Cross-Country Comparative Study. Journal of Management, 44 (8). 3364-3394. ISSN 0149-2063

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https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/255880
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