Item Type | Journal paper |
Abstract | We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and extract more ex post compensation through timely exercise of stock options. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers appear to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors. |
Authors | Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David |
Journal or Publication Title | Management Science |
Language | English |
Keywords | Price fixing, corporate governance, executive compensation. |
Subjects | business studies economics finance |
HSG Classification | contribution to scientific community |
HSG Profile Area | SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System |
Refereed | Yes |
Date | 13 May 2019 |
Publisher | INFORMS |
Place of Publication | Maryland, USA |
Volume | 65 |
Number | 10 |
Page Range | 4413-4840 |
Number of Pages | 27 |
ISSN | 0025-1909 |
Publisher DOI | https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3130 |
Official URL | https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.20... |
Contact Email Address | markus.schmid@unisg.ch |
Depositing User | Beatrix Kobelt-Glock |
Date Deposited | 19 Nov 2019 07:58 |
Last Modified | 20 Jul 2022 17:40 |
URI: | https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/258336 |
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CitationArtiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David (2019) Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers? Management Science, 65 (10). 4413-4840. ISSN 0025-1909 Statisticshttps://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/258336
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