Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and extract more ex post compensation through timely exercise of stock options. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers appear to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.
Authors Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David
Journal or Publication Title Management Science
Language English
Keywords Price fixing, corporate governance, executive compensation.
Subjects business studies
economics
finance
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System
Refereed Yes
Date 13 May 2019
Publisher INFORMS
Place of Publication Maryland, USA
Volume 65
Number 10
Page Range 4413-4840
Number of Pages 27
ISSN 0025-1909
Publisher DOI https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3130
Official URL https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.20...
Contact Email Address markus.schmid@unisg.ch
Depositing User Beatrix Kobelt-Glock
Date Deposited 19 Nov 2019 07:58
Last Modified 20 Jul 2022 17:40
URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/258336

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Citation

Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David (2019) Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers? Management Science, 65 (10). 4413-4840. ISSN 0025-1909

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https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/258336
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