Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?

Item Type	Journal paper
Abstract	We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and extract more ex post compensation through timely exercise of stock options. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers appear to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.
Authors	Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David
Journal or Publication Title	Management Science
Language	English
Keywords	Price fixing, corporate governance, executive compensation.
Subjects	business studies economics finance
HSG Classification	contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area	SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System
Refereed	Yes
Date	13 May 2019
Publisher	INFORMS
Place of Publication	Maryland, USA
Volume	65
Number	10
Page Range	4413-4840
Number of Pages	27
ISSN	0025-1909
Publisher DOI	https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3130
Official URL	https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.20...
Contact Email Address	markus.schmid@unisg.ch
Depositing User	Beatrix Kobelt-Glock
Date Deposited	19 Nov 2019 07:58
Last Modified	20 Jul 2022 17:40
URI:	https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/258336

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Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja; Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David (2019) Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers? Management Science, 65 (10). 4413-4840. ISSN 0025-1909

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https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/258336

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