Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation

Item Type Journal paper

© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. We develop a model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely, the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. Sometimes, the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).

Authors Tykvova, Tereza
Journal or Publication Title Review of Financial Economics
Language English
Subjects business studies
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
HSG Profile Area SOF - System-wide Risk in the Financial System
Refereed Yes
Date 2007
Volume 16(1)
Page Range 5-28
Number of Pages 23
Publisher DOI 10.1016/j.rfe.2005.10.001
Depositing User Diky Seematter-Yardong
Date Deposited 25 Feb 2020 11:03
Last Modified 03 Mar 2020 14:08
URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/259435


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Tykvova, Tereza (2007) Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation. Review of Financial Economics, 16(1) 5-28.


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