Unconstrained Capital? Multinational companies, structural power, and collective goods provision in dual VET

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract

Collective goods provision, most prominent in coordinated market economies, depends on certain institutional conditions that constrain employer behavior and trigger cooperation. Increased capital mobility, characterized by new exit opportunities for business and an influx of multinational companies not anchored in their new home-countries’ institutional environment, loosens those ‘beneficial constraints’. I argue that these challenges do not lead to convergence between globalized locations as the structural power of business depends on the type of firms attracted by local institutional comparative advantages. Comparing collective skill formation in two heavily globalized cantons of Switzerland, I show that a region fundamentally relying on low-tax policies sees its hands increasingly tied in the face of globalization. It must accordingly reshape collective goods provision around policies favored by business. In contrast, a location with more diverse comparative advantages is able to implement more compelling policy elements that punish uncooperative firms.

Authors Unterweger, Daniel Franz
Journal or Publication Title Socio-Economic Review
Language English
Subjects social sciences
political science
education
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
Refereed Yes
Date 2 October 2020
Publisher Oxford University Press
Number Online first
ISSN 1475-1461
Publisher DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwaa035
Depositing User Daniel Franz Unterweger
Date Deposited 05 Oct 2020 14:04
Last Modified 05 Oct 2020 14:04
URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/261132

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Unterweger, Daniel Franz (2020) Unconstrained Capital? Multinational companies, structural power, and collective goods provision in dual VET. Socio-Economic Review, (Online first). ISSN 1475-1461

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https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/id/eprint/261132
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