Location Leakage in Distance Bounding: Why Location Privacy Does not Work.

Item Type Journal paper
Abstract In many cases, we can only have access to a service by proving we are sufficiently close to a particular location (e.g. in automobile or building access control). In these cases, proximity can be guaranteed through signal attenuation. However, by using additional transmitters an attacker can relay signals between the prover and the verifier. Distance-bounding protocols are the main countermeasure against such attacks; however, such protocols may leak information regarding the location of the prover and/or the verifier who run the distance-bounding protocol. In this paper, we consider a formal model for location privacy in the context of distance-bounding. In particular, our contributions are threefold: we first define a security game for location privacy in distance bounding; secondly, we define an adversarial model for this game, with two adversary classes; finally, we assess the feasibility of attaining location privacy for distance-bounding protocols. Concretely, we prove that for protocols with a beginning or a termination, it is theoretically impossible to achieve location privacy for either of the two adversary classes, in the sense that there always exists a polynomially-bounded adversary winning the security game. However, for so-called limited adversaries, who cannot see the location of arbitrary provers, carefully chosen parameters do, in practice, enable computational location privacy.
Authors Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini; Onete, Cristina & Vaudenay, Serge
Journal or Publication Title Computers & Security
Language English
Keywords Location privacy, Distance-bounding, Authentication, Location indistinguishability, Relay attacks
Subjects computer science
HSG Classification contribution to scientific community
Refereed Yes
Date September 2014
Publisher Elsevier
Volume 45
Page Range 199-209
Number of Pages 11
ISSN 0167-4048
Publisher DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.06.001
Official URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/...
Depositing User Eriane Breu
Date Deposited 06 Apr 2021 19:33
Last Modified 20 Jul 2022 17:45
URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/262945


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Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini; Onete, Cristina & Vaudenay, Serge (2014) Location Leakage in Distance Bounding: Why Location Privacy Does not Work. Computers & Security, 45 199-209. ISSN 0167-4048


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