University of St.Gallen
research platform alexandria
search projects
browse projects
après Personnes
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 
après Année
selon project

Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance- Evidence from the fourth and fifth revision of the Swiss Disability Insurance Act

version abrégée As any other social insurance too, the Disability Insurance (DI) suffers from an inherent problem: On the one hand, the DI insures the individual against the risk that working is impossible due to a long-lasting health problem. With risk adverse individuals, the insurance is socially desirable and does contribute to aggregate welfare. On the other hand, the DI may be subject to moral hazard. Since DI benefits represent a non-earned alternative to (potentially uncertain) labor incomes, individuals whose disutility of working is large enough may apply for DI benefits or stay in the DI even though they are able to work. This behavior increases the costs for DI, which is usually paid by the general population in form of a pay-roll tax. This research project seeks to identify moral hazard in the Swiss social insurance setting using reg-ulatory changes imposed by the fourth and fifth revision of the Disability Insurance Act as natural experiments. The following research questions will be addressed: (1) Do systematic measurement errors in the assessment process exist? (2) Does stricter medical screening reduce the number of new DI pensions? (3) Do lower pension payments increase labor force participation and thus, outflow from the DI?
   
mot-clé disability insurance, moral hazard, fourth and fifth revision of the Swiss Disability Insurance Act
   
partenaire
type Projet de recherche appliquée
état courant
Départ du projet 2012
Fin du projet 2014
informations additionelles Start-up funding provided from the Economic Policy profile area
sujets Economics, social insurance, disability insurance, moral hazard
méthodes Applied empirical research
profile area SEPS - Economic Policy
Contact Eva Deuchert