University of St.Gallen
research platform alexandria
search publications
browse publications
by person
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 
by year

Eliciting Beliefs in Continuous-Choice Games: a Double Auction Experiment

abstract This paper proposes a methodology to implement probabilistic belief
elicitation in continuous-choice games. Representing subjective
probabilistic beliefs about a continuous variable as a continuous subjective
probability distribution, the methodology involves eliciting partial
information about the subjective distribution and fitting a parametric
distribution on the elicited data. As an illustration, the methodology
is applied to a double auction experiment, where traders' beliefs about
the bidding choices of other market participants are elicited. Elicited
subjective beliefs are found to differ from proxies such as Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) beliefs and empirical beliefs, both in terms
of the forecasts of other traders' bidding choices and in terms of the
best-response bidding choices prescribed by beliefs. Elicited subjective
beliefs help explain observed bidding choices better than BNE beliefs
and empirical beliefs. By extending probabilistic belief elicitation beyond
discrete-choice games to continuous-choice games, the proposed
methodology enables to investigate the role of beliefs in a wider range
of applications.
   
type journal paper
   
keywords auctions, beliefs, subjective expectations, private information, experiments
   
language English
kind of paper journal article
date of appearance 2015
journal Experimental Economics
publisher Springer
ISSN 1386-4157
ISSN (online) 1573-6938
number of issue -
page(s) ---
review blind review
   
profile area SEPS - Quantitative Economic Methods
citation Neri, C. (2015). Eliciting Beliefs in Continuous-Choice Games: a Double Auction Experiment. Experimental Economics(-), ---.