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Do independant prosecutors deter political corruption? : An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries

Anne Van Aaken, Stefan Voigt & Lars Feld

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abstract It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members that in turn increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
   
type journal paper
   
keywords
   
language English
kind of paper journal article
date of appearance 12-4-2010
journal American Law and Economics Review
publisher Oxford Journals (Oxford)
ISSN 1465-7252
ISSN (online) 1465-7260
DOI 10.1093/aler/ahq002
volume of journal 12
number of issue 1
page(s) 204-244
review blind review
   
citation van Aaken, A., Voigt, S., & Feld, L. (2010). Do independant prosecutors deter political corruption?: An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries. American Law and Economics Review, 12(1), 204-244, DOI:10.1093/aler/ahq002.