The Viable System Model by Stafford Beer embodies a theory about the preconditions of organizational viability. This theory has been discussed extensively by the academics and professionals of organizational cybernetics. The theoretical claim of the Viable System Model (VSM) is bold. It asserts to specify the necessary and sufficient preconditions for the viability of any organization. The empirical evidence, to date, amounts to a substantial corpus of case studies from applications that support the claim of the theory. The present contribution leads beyond the status quo. Its purpose is to test the theory empirically, on the grounds of a broad survey and pertinent quantitative analysis. The available data support the hypotheses and therewith corroborate the theory of the VSM. This implies that the VSM is a reliable orientation device for the diagnosis and design of organizations to strengthen their vitality, resilience, and development potential.

In this paper, we analyze the question of whether companies that sell assets to private equity funds experience higher abnormal returns than companies that sell assets to buyers with strategic interests. Moreover, we investigate whether companies that sell assets to private equity investors have different changes in systematic risks than companies that sell to strategic buyers. Using data for asset sales in Germany, Switzerland and Austria and employing event study methodology, we find that the announcement of asset sales generally generates positive abnormal returns with the transactions where there is a private equity buyer having significantly higher abnormal returns compared to transactions where there is a strategic buyer. On the other hand, we find no evidence of changes in systematic risk, neither for the sample consisting of all transactions nor for the sub-samples of sales to private equity funds and strategic buyers, respectively.

When investors commit capital to a private equity fund, the money is not immediately invested but is called by the fund manager throughout an investment period of up to five years. The private equity business model allows fund managers to invest and divest the committed capital during the fund's lifetime at their own discretion, which gives them the flexibility to time the markets. Based on 7,591 private equity deals, which are benchmarked against 14,390 M&A transaction multiples, we find evidence that on average private equity funds are able to create value by timing the financial markets. Market timing ability is not captured by performance measures such as the PME, yet it is a potential source of returns for investors.

This article analyzes an important aspect of the social behavior of the self-employed in America. We ask whether the self-employed express their social responsibility to society by giving more to charity than the general population, and if so which charitable causes they give to. We use social identity theory to generate hypotheses about the determinants and objectives of charitable giving among members of this socially and economically important group. Testing these hypotheses with nationally representative, longitudinal US data, we find that the American self-employed are indeed more likely to exhibit social responsibility toward their community by giving to charities than the general population. While the self-employed support broadly similar charities to the general population, they give substantially more to organizations which: address issues in the local community; provide health care; and serve the needy.

Drawing upon contingency theory, we analyze the antecedents and performance consequences of chief strategy officer (CSO) presence in top management teams (TMTs). We argue that strategic and structural complexity affects the decision to have a CSO in the TMT and its effect on firm performance. The results of a sample of S&P 500 firms over a five-year period reveal that diversification, acquisition activity, and TMT role interdependence are positively associated with CSO presence. However, we also find that the structural choice to have a CSO in the TMT does not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. This first systematic analysis of CSO presence informs research on CSOs and contributes to the emerging literature on TMT structure.

We empirically investigate the benefits of multiple ratings not only at issuance of debt instruments but also during the subsequent monitoring phase. Using a record of monthly credit rating migration data on all U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch between 1985 and 2012 (154'600 tranches), our results provide em-pirical evidence that rating agencies put more effort in rating and outlook revisions when tranches have assigned multiple ratings. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in the case of mul-tiple ratings, agencies do a better job in discriminating tranches with respect to default risk. On the downside, we observe a shift in collateral towards senior tranches and incentives for issuers to engage in rating shopping activities, but find no evidence that rating agencies exploit such behavior to attract more rating business. Our results contribute to the literature on information production of credit ratings and extend the perspective to the monitoring period after issuance.

Financial advisors play an important role in M&A transactions. Private equity (PE) firms, in turn, are highly sought-after clients for financial advisors as they promise lucrative business due to their frequent engagements in acquisitions. We find that PE firms pay, on average, less for portfolio companies when their sell-side advisor has worked for the acquiring PE firm on the buy-side in past transactions. We refer to this as indirect relationships and argue that conflicts of interest be-tween financial advisors and their clients are the main driver for our results. Strategic acquirers do not benefit from these previous indirect relationships altogether.

We study retail deposit withdrawals from commercial banks that were differentially exposed to distress during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We show that the propensity of clients to withdraw deposits increases with the severity of bank distress. However, an exclusive pre-crisis bank-client relationship eliminates withdrawal risk. The mechanism through which strong bank-client relationships mitigate withdrawal risk relates to the transaction costs of switching accounts rather than informational rents or differentiated services. Our findings provide empirical support to the Basel III liquidity regulations that emphasize the role of well-established client relationships for the stability of bank funding.

We assess the pricing of transactions undertaken by private equity (PE) funds in comparison to the transactions of strategic acquirers and sellers and focus on synergy gains as an explanatory factor. Controlling for company and deal characteristics, we show that PE funds pay 20% less, on average, than strategic buyers for comparable target corporations (we refer to this as the PE discount). Supplementing the existing literature on the PE discount in M&A transactions, we show that in add-on transactions, this PE discount disappears. When PE funds benefit from synergies, they are willing to pay the same price level as strategic acquirers would do in comparable transactions. In line with this synergy-related explanation, we find that PE funds sell their portfolio companies to strategic acquirers at prices comparable to those of strategic sellers. In divestitures to other PE funds (secondary deals), the PE discount prevails.