Florian Wettstein

During the last years there has been an increasing discussion on the role of business in human rights violations and an increase in human rights litigation against companies. The result of human rights litigation has been rather disillusioning because no corporation has been found guilty and most cases have been dismissed. We argue that it may nevertheless be a useful instrument for the advancement of the business and human rights agenda. We examine the determinants of successful human rights litigation in terms of judicial, educational, and regulatory effects. This article reviews more than forty corporate foreign direct liability cases and their effects on corporate human rights policies and conduct. The review shows that most corporations adjusted their human rights policies and adopted additional measures to cope with human rights issues during or shortly after the legal proceedings. Opening legal channels for human rights litigation may be one way for governments to incentivize firms to respect human rights. These findings have implications for the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as well as on our interpretation of the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Shell.

This article critically assesses the work of the UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights (SRSG) John Ruggie. The article adopts a normative perspective on the issue. Thus, its critique is derived from the standpoint of ethics. The SRSG was instrumental in shifting the burden of proof to those who deny corporate human rights responsibilities. This achievement, however, is relativized by the very restrictive interpretation of such responsibilities, both in terms of their scope as well as the normative force assigned to them. Finally, the article explores and analyzes the SRSG's relative reluctance to address and engage with ethical categories more explicitly. It outlines the dangers and blind spots that may result from this reluctance and reflects on the role that ethics can, and perhaps should, play in the broader debate on business and human rights.

More and more companies are publicly taking a stand on social and political issues such as gay marriage legislation. This paper argues that this type of engagement, which can be called ‘‘corporate political advocacy,'' raises new conceptual and normative challenges especially for theories of corporate responsibility. Furthermore, it poses practical challenges for managers who are confronted with it. This paper addresses all three challenges: first, it defines and conceptualizes corporate political advocacy and dis- tinguishes it from other forms of corporate political in- volvement. Second, it makes normative sense of corporate advocacy as an element of corporate responsibility. Third, it reflects on the practical implications for managers deal- ing with this issue.

This brief response to Smith focuses on his distinction between moral and political responsibility in general and how it relates to human rights in particular. It argues that the notion of political responsibility as is used in the debate on political CSR often does not exclude morality but is based on it.

The significance of multinationals in shaping globalization is largely undisputed. This paper argues that any agent of substantial change should, at the same time, be an agent of justice. However, while multinational companies have played instrumental roles in shaping the world in the past, they have done so with seemingly little genuine concern for the systematic advancement of global justice. Granted that the corporate social responsibility movement is still making strides, but it arguably only scratches the surface of a more holistic understanding of corporations as agents of justice. An understanding of corporations as agents of justice crystallizes around their impact on the structure of society. In other words, a perspective on justice addresses the political role and stature of multinational companies. It is, fundamentally, about corporate power and influence - and about the political responsibilities that are inevitably connected to it.

Human rights have not played an overwhelmingly prominent role in CSR in the past. Similarly, CSR has had relatively little influence on what is now called the "business and human rights debate." This contribution uncovers some of the reasons for the rather peculiar disconnect between these two debates and, based on it, presents some apparent synergies and complementarities between the two. A closer integration of the two debates, as it argues, would allow for the formulation of an expansive and demanding conception of corporate human rights obligations. Such a conception does not stop with corporate obligations "merely" to respect human rights, but includes an extended focus on proactive company involvement in the protection and realization of human rights. In other words, the integration of the two debates provides the space within which to formulate positive human rights obligations for corporations.

In his widely influential human rights framework, the former special representative for business and human rights, John Ruggie, establishes a responsibility to respect human rights for all corporations. He does so based on an instrumental account of corporate responsibility. In this paper I will systematically explore and expose the conceptual flaws underlying such instrumental arguments, specifically when invoked in connection with human rights responsibility. I will outline four relevant situations, which stake out the scope of such business case arguments in the context of human rights. Based on the analysis of those four situations, I will argue that Ruggie's instrumental defense of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights fails. While a genuinely moral argument in favor of corporate human rights responsibility would be more plausible, it implies corporate responsibilities beyond merely respecting human rights and thus challenges the framework's rigid division of responsibility between corporation and state.