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Manfred Gärtner
Former Member
Title
Prof. em. Dr.
Last Name
Gärtner
First name
Manfred
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1 - 8 of 8
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PublicationCan Tax Evasion Tame Leviathan Governments?This paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady-state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download discussion paper version] [https://commerce.metapress.com/content/p3793k08l4r0l395/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=0bt0is554pvvtav1n2gyhq55&sh=www.springerlink.com Download article (requires subscription)]Type: journal articleJournal: Public ChoiceVolume: 136Issue: 1-2, Jul
Scopus© Citations 4 -
PublicationTeaching Real Business Cycles to UndergraduatesThe authors review the graphical approach to teaching the real business cycle model introduced by Barro (1984). Graphical and exact models are compared by means of impulse response functions. The graphical analysis can be used to equip students with an understanding of the economy's supply side dynamics.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economic EducationVolume: 38Issue: 2
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PublicationCan tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?This paper looks at how income tax rates, consumption and public spending respond as venues for tax evasion open or close. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonous as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP19_Ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 19-2006
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PublicationMacroeconomic effects of bank secrecy when tax evasion is endogenousWe analyze a multi-country model in which a small group of countries adopts banking secrecy (BS) laws and a withholding tax. The other group doesn't. BS countries benefit in all relevant macroeconomic variables, including taxes and the provision of public goods. In non- BS countries most of the same variables deteriorate - when tax evasion is exogenous or its tax elasticity is moderate. When this elasticity is high, BS may drive these countries' tax rates down also, and income, consumption and wealth may rise. However, public-goods provision always deteriorates and welfare falls. We also argue that this case does not appear to be relevant empirically. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2006/DP10_ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 10-2006
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PublicationPartisan Theory and the New Keynesian and Sticky-Information Phillips Curves( 2005-12-31)
;Brevik, FrodeThis paper attempts two things: First, to modernize partisan theory by merging the idea of partisan differences in macroeconomic preferences with recent, optimizing models of aggregate supply that account for sluggish nominal adjustment. This aids in resolving some puzzles posed by the current state of partisan theory research. Second, to exploit partisan patterns for a comparison of the empirical performance of the new Keynesian Phillips curve with that of a recent challenger, the sticky-information Phillips curve. It turns out that the sticky-information Phillips curve clearly outperforms its better established rival: in accounting for econometric estimates of partisan patterns in OECD countries, and in tracking post-war experience in the US. [http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2005/DP-25_Ga.pdf Download full text]Type: discussion paperIssue: 25-2005 -
PublicationWelfare and distribution effects of bank secrecy laws( 2005-03-01)
;Brevik, FrodeWe analyze an overlapping-generations world comprising two groups of small countries whose preferences for public spending differ. Key steady-state effects from introducing bank secrecy and a withholding tax in countries with low government spending are: a reduction of global capital and income, a shift of wealth towards bank-secrecy countries, and falling consumption, welfare and government spending despite rising tax rates in the rest of the world. Qualitative results are robust to changes in tax-payer honesty, the Leviathan effect (permitting governments to drive public spending higher than citizens prefer), and the fraction of withholding taxes repatriated to countries of residence. -
PublicationTeaching real business cycles to undergraduates( 2004-01-01)
;Brevik, FrodeType: discussion paperIssue: 2004-05