Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Debt Renegotiations Outside Distress
    (Oxford University Press, 2022) ;
    Westermann, Ramona
    This paper develops a model to explore the implications of non-distressed debt renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies. The model incorporates the empirical observation that creditors can influence firms also outside corporate distress through debt covenant renegotiation and not only in distress. We find that considering both distressed and non-distressed creditor interventions is key to investigating how creditor governance affects firms. The model explains cross-sectional patterns of control premiums and credit spreads that traditional debt renegotiation models do not capture. We also derive novel implications for the impact of firm characteristics associated with renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies.
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  • Publication
    Creditor Control Rights and the Pricing of Private Loans
    This paper investigates the influence of creditor control rights on the pricing and design of corporate loans. We construct a novel dataset, which combines individual borrower, lender, and loan characteristics with covenant violation data. The dataset contains observations, in which borrowers are in violation only with some of their multiple creditors. This data structure allows us to address the endogeneity concerns of the standard quasi-regression discontinuity design that uses covenant violations to identify shifts in creditor control rights. We find that creditors exploit their control rights to overprice new loans and tighten the loan conditions.