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Stefan Bühler
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Bühler
First name
Stefan
Email
stefan.buehler@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 2303
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 55
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PublicationVertical Structure and the Risk of Rent Extraction in the Electricity IndustryThis paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale market, we show that welfare is highest if competition in generation and retailing is combined with vertical separation. Vertically integrated generators choose excessively high retail prices and capacities to avoid rent extraction in the wholesale market when their retail demand exceeds their capacity. Vertical separation eliminates the risk of rent extraction and yields lower retail prices.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economics & Management StrategyVolume: 29Issue: 1
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PublicationExplaining Escalating Prices and Fines: A Unified ApproachThis paper provides an explanation for escalating prices and fines based on a unified analytical framework that nests monopoly pricing and optimal law enforcement. We show that escalation emerges as an optimal outcome if the principal (i) lacks commitment ability, and (ii) gives less than full weight to agent benefits. Escalation is driven by decreasing transfers for non-active agents rather than increasing transfers for active agents. Some forward-looking agents then strategically delay their activity, which drives a wedge between the optimal static transfer and the benefit of an indifferent agent. This wedge is the source of escalation.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVolume: 171
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PublicationWhen Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment?This paper examines the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Employing reduced-form analysis, we show that strategic crowding out occurs if (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes, and (ii) private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm's perspective. We discuss how our analysis applies to real-world markets and argue that it provides an explanation for the ambivalent evidence on the effect of public on private investment: State ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to occur.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Industry, Competition and TradeVolume: 14Issue: 3
Scopus© Citations 3 -
PublicationMaking Sense of Nonbinding Retail-Price RecommendationsWe model retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device in vertical supply relations with private manufacturer information on production costs and consumer demand. With static trade, RPRs are irrelevant, and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient. With repeated trade, RPRs can become part of a relational contract, communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing joint surplus. We show that this contract is self-enforcing if the retailer's profit is independent of production costs and punishment strategies are chosen appropriately. The predictions of our analysis are consistent with the available empirical evidence.Type: journal articleJournal: American Economic ReviewVolume: 103Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 20 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Small Business EconomicsVolume: 39Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 43 -
PublicationThe Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition : A NoteWe examine the impact of price cap regulation on the capacity investments of oligopolistic suppliers facing time-varying demand. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment.Type: journal articleJournal: Economics LettersVolume: 106Issue: 2
Scopus© Citations 2 -
PublicationIntimidating Competitors : Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive OligopolyThis paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. Analyzing a linear Cournot model, we establish the following key results: (i) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). (ii) Asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome. (iii) Compared to a benchmark model without investment, complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome. We argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear Cournot model under reasonable assumptions.Type: journal articleJournal: International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume: 26Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 30 -
PublicationMobile Number Portability in EuropeThis paper examines the causes and effects of mobile number portability (MNP) and provides a survey of its implementation in Europe. It first examines the competitive effects and costs of introducing MNP. Next, it discusses how to charge for MNP. It argues that a price cap regime starting from the average cost of porting is likely to provide appropriate incentives. Finally, it reviews recent experience with implementing MNP in Europe. Differences in the speed of porting and porting charges appear to explain part of the differences in the use of MNP across countries.Type: journal articleJournal: Telecommunications PolicyVolume: 30Issue: 7
Scopus© Citations 56 -
PublicationDeregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality TradeoffsThis paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Regulatory EconomicsVolume: 30Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 14 -
PublicationStrategic Outsourcing RevisitedThis paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals' costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVolume: 61Issue: 3
Scopus© Citations 54