Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Zellweger
First name
Thomas
Email
thomas.zellweger@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 71 00
Google Scholar
1 - 4 of 4
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PublicationPredecessor CEO retention as board chair in family and nonfamily firmsWe challenge the negative view that predecessor retention – the appointment of outgoing CEOs as board chairs – deteriorates post-succession firm performance. We posit that predecessor retention improves post-succession performance in family firms since predecessors are more likely to act as mentors to their successors whereas their counterparts in nonfamily firms tend to behave opportunistically. Exploring variance among family firms, we suggest that successor mentoring is most valuable under a heightened ability of the predecessor to mentor and a pronounced need of the successor for mentoring. Probing a matched sample of 305 CEO successions in S&P1500 firms between 2001 and 2013, our results complement CEO succession research by introducing a CEO mentoring perspective and by differentiating between family and nonfamily firms.
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PublicationSelling what you love : Divestiture activity in family-controlled firmsBased on agency theory, prior studies in divestiture literature argued and found that blockholder ownership functions as a catalyst of divestiture activity. This reasoning, however, assumes that all types of blockholders are primarily interested in utilizing their power to optimize the economic benefits of their ownership stakes. Drawing on socioemotional wealth perspective, the present study challenges this assumption for the case of family block ownership. As a baseline, we propose that family block ownership decreases the likelihood of divestiture occurrence since divestitures pose severe threats to family owners’ socioemotional benefits. Further, we analyze under which conditions financial wealth considerations outweigh socioemotional wealth considerations. Counter to our theoretical prediction, our empirical findings indicate that financial performance is not a sufficiently strong contingency factor which helps overcome the greater reluctance of family-controlled firms to engage in divestiture. Instead, our results suggest that to offset this greater reluctance financial wealth concerns need to pair with institutional legitimacy concerns in order to increase the likelihood of divestiture by family-controlled firms. Our study thus extends agency theory and contributes to both family and divestiture literatures.
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PublicationIntangible resources and family firm performance: the moderating role family involvement in strategy making( 2008-06-30)