https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch
University of St.Gallenennew publications - Carlo StrubAlexandria::new publicationsA General and Intuitive Envelope TheoremStrub, C. (2013). A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem: mimeo. ---
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/223396
2013-06-07Envelope Theorems for Non-Smooth and Non-Concave OptimizationClausen, A., & Strub, C. (2012). Envelope Theorems for Non-Smooth and Non-Concave Optimization: University of Zurich. --- We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem: first-order conditions are necessary at interior optimal choices. We only assume differentiability of the ...
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/220551
2013-02-18Money CyclesClausen, A., & Strub, C. (2011). Money Cycles. St. Gallen: University of St. Gallen. --- It is well known that agents may smooth out non-convexities using lotteries. Can agents use time and money instead? We show that in a labor model with a fixed cost of working, workers perfectly smooth their consumption if they have access to money governed by the Friedman rule. Away from the Friedman rule, workers repeat their choices over money cycles of finite length. They begin cycles with no ...
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/220550
2013-02-18Grundzüge der analytischen MakroökonomieHens, T., & Strub, C. (2004). Grundzüge der analytischen Makroökonomie: Springer. - ISBN 3-540-20082-7. ---
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/63302
2010-06-09Central Bank Design with Heterogenous AgentsBerentsen, A., & Strub, C. (2009). Central Bank Design with Heterogenous Agents. European Economic Review, 2(53), 139-152. --- We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best ...
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/63301
2010-06-09