A general model of boundedly rational observational learning: theory and evidence
journal paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/245262
en

This paper introduces a model of boundedly rational observational learning, which is rationally founded and applicable to general environments. Under QuasiBayesian updating each action is treated as if it were based only on the private information of its respective observed agent. We analyze the theoretical long run implications of QuasiBayesian updating in a model of repeated interaction in social networks with binary actions. We characterize the environments in which consensus and information aggregation is achieved and establish that for any environment information aggregation fails in large networks. Evidence from a laboratory experiment supports QuasiBayesian updating and our theoretical predictions.
Neri, Claudia
06112015
2015
Neri, C. (2015). A general model of boundedly rational observational learning: theory and evidence. (), .
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Quantal response equilibrium in a double auction
journal paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/245261
en
urn:ISSN:21961085
doi:10.1007/s4050501400384
Economic Theory Bulletin
This paper establishes existence and uniqueness of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) in a double auction. The concept of QRE has the intuitive property that a deviation from best response is less likely the higher the cost associated with the deviation itself. Thanks to such property, the QRE accommodates stochastic elements in the analysis of the strategic decisionmaking that arises in the double auction. By providing a theoretical alternative to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model, the QRE model offers an appealing tool for analyzing data of double auction experiments.
Neri, Claudia
01042015
2015
Neri, C. (2015). Quantal response equilibrium in a double auction. Economic Theory Bulletin, 3(1), 7990, DOI:10.1007/s4050501400384.
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Freedom, Power, and Interference
working paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/236986
en
We propose a behavioral theory of preference for decision rights, driven by preference for freedom, power, and noninterference, which can lead subjects to value decision rights intrinsically, i.e. beyond the expected utility associated with them. We conduct a novel laboratory experiment in which the effect of each preference is distinguished. We find that the intrinsic value of decision rights is driven more strongly by preference for noninterference than by preference for freedom or power. This result suggests that individuals value decision rights not because they enjoy the freedom of making a choice, nor because they enjoy having power over other individuals, but rather because they dislike letting other individuals interfere in their outcomes. Our theoretical framework and experimental findings lead to a fundamental change in perspective on preference for decision rights.
decision rights, freedom, power, interference, experiments
Neri, Claudia
2015
2015
Neri, C. (2015). Freedom, Power, and Interference: .
none
Eliciting Beliefs in ContinuousChoice Games: a Double Auction Experiment
journal paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/210729
en
doi:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs1068301494201
Experimental Economics
This paper proposes a methodology to implement probabilistic belief
elicitation in continuouschoice games. Representing subjective
probabilistic beliefs about a continuous variable as a continuous subjective
probability distribution, the methodology involves eliciting partial
information about the subjective distribution and fitting a parametric
distribution on the elicited data. As an illustration, the methodology
is applied to a double auction experiment, where traders' beliefs about
the bidding choices of other market participants are elicited. Elicited
subjective beliefs are found to differ from proxies such as Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) beliefs and empirical beliefs, both in terms
of the forecasts of other traders' bidding choices and in terms of the
bestresponse bidding choices prescribed by beliefs. Elicited subjective
beliefs help explain observed bidding choices better than BNE beliefs
and empirical beliefs. By extending probabilistic belief elicitation beyond
discretechoice games to continuouschoice games, the proposed
methodology enables to investigate the role of beliefs in a wider range
of applications.
auctions, beliefs, subjective expectations, private information, experiments
Neri, Claudia
01122015
2015
Neri, C. (2015). Eliciting Beliefs in ContinuousChoice Games: a Double Auction Experiment. Experimental Economics, 18(4), 569608, DOI:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs1068301494201.
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/210732.pdf
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QuasiBayesian Observational Learning
working paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/236987
en
This paper introduces a general approach to modeling boundedly rational observational learning in dynamic environments of decision making under uncertainty. QuasiBayesian updating reduces the complexity of fully rational inferences from observed actions by treating each observed action as if it were based only on the initial private information of the respective decision maker. We conduct a laboratory experiment of observational learning in a social network and find strong evidence for QuasiBayesian updating. Further, we consider a general model of repeated interaction in social networks with binary actions, and provide a characterization of the informational environment such that consensus occurs in any strongly connected network structure, under QuasiBayesian updating functions. Finally, we show that asymptotic learning fails as the size of the network grows to infinity.
learning, networks, experiments, consensus, bounded rationality, Bayesian, nonBayesian
Neri, Claudia
2014
2014
Neri, C. (2014). QuasiBayesian Observational Learning: .
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First and Secondorder Subjective Expectations in Strategic DecisionMaking: Experimental Evidence
journal paper
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/210731
en
urn:ISSN:08998256
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.001
Games and Economic Behavior
We study first and secondorder subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decisionmaking. We elicit probabilistically both first and secondorder beliefs and apply the method to a HideandSeek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed choice coincides with the optimal action given elicited beliefs. We study the relationship between first and secondorder beliefs under a coherence criterion. Weak coherence requires that if an event is assigned, according to firstorder beliefs, a probability higher/lower/equal to the one assigned to another event, then the same holds according to secondorder beliefs. Strong coherence requires the probability assigned according to first and secondorder beliefs to coincide. Evidence of heterogeneity across participants is reported. Verbal comments collected at the end of the experiment shed light on how subjects think and decide in a complex environment that is strategic, dynamic and populated by potentially heterogeneous individuals.
decisionmaking, beliefs, subjective expectations, experiments
Neri, Claudia
Manski, Charles F.
0092013
2013
Neri, C., & Manski, C. F. (2013). First and Secondorder Subjective Expectations in Strategic DecisionMaking: Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 81(1), 232254, DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.001.
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