Uncertainty, Network Change and Costly Signaling: How the Network of Diplomatic Visits Affects the Initiation of International Conflict

Bargaining theories of war emphasize private information as a cause of conflict. Leaders are uncertain about one another's military strength, preferences, and trustworthiness which may lead to the outbreak of conflict. Thus, a critical step in the onset of conflict is determining what leaders know and where they get their information from. I argue that what state leaders know is the result of their embeddedness in international networks. These networks can serve as an infrastructure for information exchange and as a costly signaling device. Leaders may communicate with other leaders to obtain strategic information about potential opponents. They may also use the pattern of their interactions to disseminate costly signals about their preferences and demonstrate trustworthiness and alliances. Using data on diplomatic visits from 1990 to 2004 and employing network statistics, I show that states' positions in the diplomatic visits network are a powerful predictor of conflict initiation.