Trust and Formal Contracts in Interorganizational Relationships - Substitutes and Complements
Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics
ISSN
0143-6570
ISSN-Digital
1099-1468
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2007-12
Author(s)
Abstract
We hypothesize that trust is a moderator of the direct relationship between control and coordination concerns and contractual complexity. Our results suggest that high trust weakens the positive relationship between control concerns and contractual complexity and reinforces the positive relationship between coordination concerns and contractual complexity. By highlighting the dual role of contracts (i.e. a controlling and coordinating function) and the moderating role of trust in this regard, our paper provides a new focus to the current discussion on the relationship between trust and contracts (i.e. substitutes or complements) that may help reconcile some divergent perspectives in the literature.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher place
Chichester
Volume
28
Number
8
Start page
833
End page
847
Pages
15
Subject(s)
Division(s)
Eprints ID
230576