Decision rights: freedom, power, and interference
Type
conference lecture
Date Issued
2016-09-01
Author(s)
Rommeswinkel, Hendrik
Abstract
We propose a general theoretical model of decision‐rights allocation and choice, formulated in the context of a dynamic psychological game. Decision rights are valued not only instrumentally, i.e. according to the expected utility associated with the achieved outcomes, but also intrinsically, i.e. according to the procedure by which outcomes are achieved. As such procedural motivations, our model introduces freedom, power and interference. We conduct a novel laboratory experiment in which the separate effect of each belief‐dependent preference can be distinguished. We find that the intrinsic value of decision rights is driven strongly by an aversion to interference. This result suggests that individuals value decision rights because they dislike letting other individuals interfere on their outcomes.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Event Title
2016 European meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA)
Event Location
Bergen (Norway)
Event Date
31.08.-01.11.2016
Subject(s)
Contact Email Address
claudia.neri@unisg.ch
Eprints ID
249338
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slides_freedom_power.pdf
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2.52 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
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