Matthias Lutz

Does official aid pave the road for private foreign investment or does it suffocate private initiative by diverting resources towards unproductive activities? We explore this question using panel data covering a large number of developing and emerging economies during the 1990s. Controlling for countries' institutional environment, we find that, evaluated at the mean, the marginal effect of aid on private foreign investment is close to zero. Surprisingly, however, the effect is strictly positive for countries in which private agents face a substantial regulatory burden. This result is robust across a wide range of specifications, samples and estimation methods.

The paper uses micro-level price data from the European car market to examine why there are deviations from the law of one price. The absolute law of one price is strongly rejected, but there is convergence to its relative version. Two sets of explanations are considered: (i) price-setting in segmented markets, and (ii) arbitrage barriers. Overall, the determinants of arbitrage costs have more explanatory power. The single most important factor is the distance between markets. Evidence for Belgium and Luxembourg suggests that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.

This paper is motivated by the large fine the EuropeanCommission imposed on Volkswagen in January 1998 forobstructing sales to foreigners. The first partdiscusses the competitive framework in which the carsector operates, especially the exclusive dealershipsystem. This is followed by a detailed examination ofthe degree of price-differentiation across nationalmarkets by 24 major manufacturers. The evidencereveals VW and Audi not to be special cases. Thisfinding implies that the Commission should reconsiderits own block exemption if it wants to establisha more competitive car market along the principles ofthe Common Market.