Stefan Morkötter

When investors commit capital to a private equity fund, the money is not immediately invested but is called by the fund manager throughout an investment period of up to five years. The private equity business model allows fund managers to invest and divest the committed capital during the fund's lifetime at their own discretion, which gives them the flexibility to time the markets. Based on 7,591 private equity deals, which are benchmarked against 14,390 M&A transaction multiples, we find evidence that on average private equity funds are able to create value by timing the financial markets. Market timing ability is not captured by performance measures such as the PME, yet it is a potential source of returns for investors.

We study retail deposit withdrawals from commercial banks that were differentially exposed to distress during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We show that the propensity of clients to withdraw deposits increases with the severity of bank distress. However, an exclusive pre-crisis bank-client relationship eliminates withdrawal risk. The mechanism through which strong bank-client relationships mitigate withdrawal risk relates to the transaction costs of switching accounts rather than informational rents or differentiated services. Our findings provide empirical support to the Basel III liquidity regulations that emphasize the role of well-established client relationships for the stability of bank funding.

We study insider trading in family firms and compare the profitability of insider purchases and sales of family insiders, i.e. insiders who are related to the founding family, to those of nonfamily insiders, i.e. insiders without such family ties. Probing a sample of 37,012 insider trades from 241 family firms, we find that family insiders generate higher abnormal returns compared to nonfamily insiders for insider purchases. For insider sales, transactions that imply significant litigation and reputational risks, the profitability is significantly lower for family insiders compared to nonfamily insiders. We also distinguish between family insiders who are actively involved in the firm and family insiders who are significant shareholders but not otherwise involved in the firm. The profitability of insider sales is significantly higher for family insiders without management involvement, who are thereby under less regulatory scrutiny, compared to insider sales by family insiders with an active management role.

We empirically investigate the benefits of multiple ratings not only at issuance of debt instruments but also during the subsequent monitoring phase. Using a record of monthly credit rating migration data on all U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch between 1985 and 2012 (154'600 tranches), our results provide em-pirical evidence that rating agencies put more effort in rating and outlook revisions when tranches have assigned multiple ratings. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in the case of mul-tiple ratings, agencies do a better job in discriminating tranches with respect to default risk. On the downside, we observe a shift in collateral towards senior tranches and incentives for issuers to engage in rating shopping activities, but find no evidence that rating agencies exploit such behavior to attract more rating business. Our results contribute to the literature on information production of credit ratings and extend the perspective to the monitoring period after issuance.

Based on an empirical analysis of European corporations, we investigate the impact of sover-eign risk on the pricing of corporate credit risk. In our paper, we show that sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) are positively correlated with corresponding corporate CDS spreads and are a significant factor for corporate CDS pricing models. We also find that this impact in-creases throughout the sovereign debt crisis in 2010-2011 and is more distinctive for Eurozone countries that were more exposed to the sovereign debt crisis than others. We further observe that this effect is particularly pronounced for corporations with a high dependency on their domestic market.

We compare liquidity patterns of 10,979 failed and non-failed US banks from 2001 to mid-2010 and detect diverging capital structures: failing banks distinctively change their liquidity position about three to five years prior to default by increasing liquid assets and decreasing liquid liabilities. The build-up of liquid assets is primarily driven by short term loans, whereas long term loan positions are significantly reduced. By abandoning (positive) term transformation throughout the intermediate period prior to a default, failing banks drift away from the traditional banking business model. We show that this liquidity shift is induced by window dressing activities towards bondholders and money market investors as well as a bad client base.

As observed throughout the financial crisis in 2008 CDS contracts are not only exposed to the credit risk of the underlying reference entity but also to the counterparty risk of the protection seller. Conducting a panel regression analysis based on CDS contracts from 2004 to 2009 in Europe and North America for 198 reference entities we find that market-oriented counterparty risk measures are reflected in the pricing of CDS contracts. The impact of counterparty risk is decreasing with a higher creditworthiness of the underlying reference entity. We show that counterparty risk has been incorporated in the CDS spreads for North American reference entities already prior to the financial crisis, whereas for European reference entities the pricing impact only intensified with the outbreak of the financial crisis in September 2008. Market-based counterparty risk measures have a higher impact on the pricing of CDS contracts as compared to measures relying on the correlation structures of asset returns of reference entities and CDS counterparties.