Monika Bütler

Home ownership is not only an important asset, but also provides an income stream in kind. If individuals use pension savings to purchase real estate, they face a trade-off between alleviating borrowing constraints when young and lower liquid retirement means when old. We study the decision to withdraw retirement assets for home purchase in advance by analyzing a recent reform. A change in down payment requirements made such early withdrawals less attractive, as borrowers are obliged to provide a larger amount of non-pension equity for a home purchase. Using individual-level data from a large Swiss occupational pension provider, we find that the share of individuals who withdrew in a given year dropped by one sixth. For the withdrawers, the average share of pension assets withdrawn decreased by percentage points, mainly driven by individuals with lower levels of pension wealth and of older age. Nonetheless, our analysis also shows that while limiting second pillar withdrawals can aggravate the borrowing constraint to some degree, they are not the only constraining factor when purchasing a home.

How does transparency affect voting behavior? To answer this question we exploit a switch from a show of hands to electronic voting in the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament. The change, which took place halfway through the 2011–2015 legislative period, also brought about the online publication of individual voting records. Using the Lower House as a control group, we compare individual voting decisions in a set of identical votes in both chambers. This unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effect of increased transparency on legislators' choices. Since the reform, members of the Upper House are less likely to deviate from the majority decision of their party. Legislators representing the same canton are also less likely to cast an aligned vote, suggesting that voters lose influence over their representatives in parliament.

A comparative sociologist who has spent her international career in academia—Marion Fourcade—and a practically minded academic economist with an extended stint in the Swiss government—Aymo Brunetti—offer their views on the role of economists in politics and society. Although Fourcade and Brunetti differ a lot in terms of experience and interest, their insightful and nuanced assessments of economics today are often remarkably similar. Marion Fourcade addresses economists with the Japanese attitude of a 30-degree bow. She modestly calls her views “from below” and she refrains from throwing the gauntlet to the economics profession, as many representatives of social sciences have done in the past. That does not mean she turns a blind eye on some weaknesses of our field. Yet, she portraits problematic issues as interesting aspects of economics. Her text is a pleasure to read because it is an invitation to think about our field, rather than a challenge to a duel.

We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative. Politicians decide about a political compromise - a counter proposal - after which petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the vote. In equilibrium, politicians infer the initiative's popularity from the number of signatures and collection time. The more the initiative is perceived as a threat to the status quo, the more likely politicians come up with a counter proposal. Under certain conditions, petitioners have the incentive to collect more signatures than required for qualification to demonstrate high success probability. We test model predictions using the data set of all Swiss constitutional initiatives at the federal level between 1891 and 2010. Overall, we find supporting evidence for the model mechanisms. Fast signature collection is associated with a higher probability of reform. The effect is mediated through a higher probability of provoking a counter proposal. Ultimately, counter proposals are key to amending the status quo. Restricting the signature collection time reduces the informative mechanism of the signature collection process considerably.

Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.