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Samia Costa
Former Member
Title
Prof. PhD
Last Name
Costa
First name
Samia
Phone
+41 71 224 3676
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1 - 7 of 7
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PublicationDo Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption?International organizations have encouraged countries to adopt Freedom of Information (FOI) laws as a means to increase transparency and thus combat corruption. This paper uses the recent introduction of FOI laws in several countries as a natural experiment to determine their effect on corruption perceptions and the quality of governance. Using different corruption perception indices, both at the macro- and micro-level, I find that countries that adopted FOI laws saw an increase in perceived corruption and a decrease in the quality of governance, rather than the expected improvement. This increase in corruption perception seems to take place in the initial years of the reform, with no significant decrease in the long term. Countries with a free press appear to be the ones experiencing the increase. Results are robust throughout different samples and specifications.Type: journal articleJournal: The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationVolume: 29Issue: 6DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ews016
Scopus© Citations 39 -
PublicationIncome and Vote Switching Between Local and National Elections: Evidence from New York StateBetween 1994 and 2004, New York State voters returned a Republican governor but always cast a majority of the popular vote in favor of the Democratic candidate in the presidential election. This paper exploits those elections in an effort to understand voters' motivations to switch party allegiances from presidential to gubernatorial elections. We argue that voters are likely to switch political allegiances between gubernatorial and presidential elections because they understand that the purpose of these elections is different. Using individual-level data, we find that low-income individuals are the main source of the switch in the vote.Type: journal articleJournal: Economics Bulletin : EBVolume: 4Issue: 10
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PublicationDo Rapid Political and Trade Liberalizations Increase Corruption?Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have undergone reform. However, there has been no study of whether different combinations of reforms cause an increase in corruption. Theory provides some guidance as to the direction of causality-on the one hand, reforms make politicians accountable to voters as well as introducing more competition, which should decrease corruption. On the other hand, reforms may not be credible, which provides for an incentive for corruption. This paper uses the numerous cases of political and economic liberalizations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s to examine this issue. The findings are that undertaking both types of reforms in rapid succession leads to a decrease in corruption, while countries that liberalized more than 5 years after democratizing experienced an increase in corruption.Type: journal articleJournal: European Journal of Political EconomyVolume: 23Issue: 4
Scopus© Citations 25 -
PublicationThe Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government InterestsMissing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements.Type: journal articleJournal: Economics & PoliticsVolume: 19Issue: 3
Scopus© Citations 3 -
PublicationThe Political Economy of the European Customs ClassificationCustoms classification is an important element in a country's trade policy. How a good is classified can affect the rate of duty that applies, the coverage of non-tariff barriers, and the formulation and application of rules of origin. Reclassifications can occur because of the introduction of a new product, but also because of protectionist motives. This paper is the first attempt at explaining these reclassifications. Focusing on the European Union, I examine whether the number of tariff lines in an industry result from the introduction of new products or from protectionist lobbying. The analysis focuses on 90 manufacturing industries over 12 years. Results suggest that protectionist lobbying does play a role in explaining changes in the EU's customs classification.Type: journal articleJournal: Public ChoiceVolume: 129Issue: 1-2
Scopus© Citations 7 -
PublicationThe Incidence of the Gasoline TaxThis paper tests whether the state gasoline tax has been fully shifted to consumers. Using a dataset of gasoline prices at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level and state taxes from 1983- 1999, we perform yearly regressions to determine whether the tax has been fully passed on, and how the degree of shifting has changed over time. Results indicate that though the tax is fully shifted at the end of the period, it has experienced periods of under-shifting. These results are robust to eliminating states with ad valorem sales taxes on gasoline.Type: book section
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PublicationGovernment Repression and the Death Toll from Natural DisastersNatural disasters have been a major cause of human suffering. Countries with higher income, lower inequality, lower corruption, and more democratic regimes have been found to experience less casualties from disasters. Government repression, however, could also play a role in disaster preparedness. In particular, I examine whether governments that are deemed to be human rights violators, which may not expect to receive assistance, experience lower casualties due perhaps to greater investment in disaster preparedness. I find an inverse U-shaped relationship between repression and casualties, with countries at either end of the distribution experiencing lower fatalities.