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Emilia Garcia-Appendini
Former Member
Last Name
Garcia-Appendini
First name
Emilia
Email
emilia.garcia-appendini@unisg.ch
Now showing
1 - 10 of 11
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Financial Markets and Portfolio ManagementIssue: forthcoming
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Economia & ManagementVolume: 2013Issue: 3
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PublicationFirms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007-2008 financial crisisUsing a supplier-client matched sample, we study the effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on between-firm liquidity provision. Consistent with a causal effect of a negative shock to bank credit, we find that firms with high pre-crisis liquidity levels increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced better performance as compared to ex-ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and provide an important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume: 109Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 305 -
PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationTrade Credit and Its Role in Entrepreneurial FinanceRecent research has found evidence of the central role of trade credit in the financing of small businesses. In the United States, for example, trade credit is used by about 60 percent of small businesses; such a large incidence of use is not observed in any other financial service except checking accounts. This article analyzes several aspects of the trade credit agreement. It starts by explaining why trade credit is such an extended phenomenon in spite of the existence of a specialized financial sector. Then it discusses several aspects that make trade credit a unique and not fully contractual arrangement, whose value depends to a great extent on the value of the commercial relationship between the supplier and the buyer. It then focuses on the value of trade credit for entrepreneurial firms.Type: book section
Scopus© Citations 52 -
PublicationContracts and Returns in Private Equity InvestmentsWe analyze the relationship between contracts and returns in private equity (PE) investments. Contractual control in the form of covenants tends to be employed to identify good deals. Better quality fi?rms are more likely to have covenant-rich contracts, as they are less concerned by the constraints imposed by the covenants. PE investors appoint closer associates of the fund in deals that are performing poorly but tend to outsource board governance in better deals. Collectively, our evidence suggests that PE investors operate along two dimensions, choosing covenants and board seats di¤erently, based on the ex-ante quality of the company.Type: forthcomingJournal: Journal of Financial IntermediationIssue: in press, available online
Scopus© Citations 21 -
PublicationType: presentation
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PublicationType: working paperVolume: 2017/07Issue: 07
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PublicationExperience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art AuctionsFocusing on the art market, where auction houses act as brokers between art sellers and buyers, we investigate whether more experienced brokers achieve better performance as information providers. We use a unique data set of auctions of Italian paintings in various houses around the world, and we measure experience as the number of times an auctioneer has auctioned the artworks of a certain artist in a given location. We find that more experienced auction houses (i) are more likely to sell and (ii) provide more precise pre-sale estimates. These findings suggest that experience plays an important role for brokers to reduce illiquidity and opacity in markets with asymmetric information.
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PublicationThe Real costs of Industry ContagionIn this paper I analyze whether the higher financing costs following the distress or bankruptcy of one firm affect the real investment decisions of non-distressed industry competitors. To achieve identification of the causal effect of contagion on investment, I use a difference-in-differences approach that compares within-firm changes in investment around the industry distress for non-distressed competitors with large proportions of their debt maturing immediately after the industry distress, relative to other non-distressed competitors in the same industry but that did not have debt maturing immediately after the industry distress. Results suggest that the former firms, which are more affected by the higher costs of financing due to contagion, reduce their capital expenditures to capital ratio by around 10% more than the less-sensitive firms. Further results show that contagion effects are milder in concentrated and low-leveraged industries, as well as in industries that do not rely too heavily on external financing.