Roy Gava

This article analyses the nature of policy debates on financial regulation during the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by considering three elements that shape them: the salience of the debate, the actors that dominate the debate, and the degree of anti-status quo pressure. Theoretically, it contributes to Culpepper’s quiet/noisy politics framework by clarifying its multidimensionality and explicitly introducing the degree of contestation. Empirically, it focuses on two regulatory issues: (1) the restriction of banking and financial activities and (2) the debate on the remuneration of bankers. The data captures political claims during the first 12 months of the GFC and covers 19 established democracies. The findings indicate that policy debates were unevenly politicized across countries and issues, and that structural factors are not enough to account for the observed variation in pressure for reform for all types of actors, thus constituting a puzzle for further research.

This article presents an empirical and qualitative analysis of the judicial review of the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority’s (FINMA) enforce­ment of financial market laws by the Federal Adminis­trative Court and the Federal Supreme Court. It is part of a broader research project on global enforcement against financial institutions and their managers and employees. Based on an overview of FINMA’s enforcement, the appeal rate against FINMA decisions and the success rate of such complaints is discussed. In addi­tion, the article analyses key areas in which the courts have supported or set limits to FINMA practices. State­ments on the right to a fair trial and the scope of FIN­MA’s discretion are the object of a special analysis. In an overall assessment, the authors come to the conclu­sion that, despite FINMA’s relatively high success rate in court, there is an effective judicial control over its enforcement.