Ernst Mohr

This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which teams are semi-autonomous. The only hierarchical intervention in teamwork is when a superior is called in by a team member to adjudicate alleged cases of free-riding or unjustified lateral punishment (flat hierarchy) according to publicly known adjudicative rules (adjudication culture), using for statistical inference a publicly known organizational norm for teamwork cooperation. It is shown that it is advantageous to set a non-elitist organizational teamwork norm. Furthermore, fairness in adjudication is valuable for economic reasons alone.

Studies the informal insurance and sustainable management of common-pool marine resources at the fisheries in Ha'apai, Tonga. Identification of fishing technologies; History of the property rights system governing marine resources; Regulation of fishing activity.

A model is analysed in which a sovereign country engages in independent obligations to repay a creditor bank and to keep an environmental treaty. It is shown that the linkage of both obligations through a cross-default contract, whereby the sovereign is deemed to be in default of both contracts if either is defaulted on, may reduce the sovereign risk attached to both the debt and the environmental contracts. A sufficient condition for this is that the initial sovereign risks be not too high. Moreover, the linkage will create an incentive for the sovereign and the bank to engage in a debt-for-nature swap.

A situation is analyzed in which two countries negotiate the financing of costs that accrue if one of them switches onto a sustainable development path. The other country's incentive to pay arises as it benefits from the developing country's environmental resources, but at an ever declining rate as long as development remains nonsustainable. In an application to the protection of tropical rainforests it is shown that North to South redistribution of welfare would be substantial, yet the North would still gain enormously in efficiency terms. An explanation is given of why the Rio Conference failed in terms of rainforest protection.

A situation is analyzed in which two countries negotiate the financing of costs that accrue if one of them switches onto a sustainable development path. The other country's incentive to pay arises as it benefits from the developing country's environmental resources, but at an ever declining rate as long as development remains nonsustainable. In an application to the protection of tropical rainforests it is shown that North to South redistribution of welfare would be substantial, yet the North would still gain enormously in efficiency terms. An explanation is given of why the Rio Conference failed in terms of rainforest protection.

The climate policy issue is in a state where different visions or proposals compete with one another in the political arena. The success of such a vision or proposal largely depends on the success of its proponents in persuading the public or a yet undecided ultimate authority of its merits. This essay identifies a discounting related ambiguity in cost-benefit analyses of climate change, making two competing visions and proposals "legitimate." By placing the induced opportunity for greenhouse policy persuasion in a political economy context, it is shown how visionaries and lobbyists can exploit human time preferences for the purpose of greenhouse policy persuasion.

We investigate the joint occurrence of international intertemporal trade and international environmental-permit trade, both of which are subject to country sovereignty. Assuming that side payments cannot be made to keep a debtor country from terminating international environmental cooperation, we analyze the impact of these two trade opportunities on a debtor country's incentive to continue environmental cooperation. We also show how, by way of a suitable strategic linkage between debt and permit trade, the public good of ensuring continued environmental cooperation can be provided by the supply side of private international loans.