Winfried Koeniger
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Koeniger
First name
Winfried
Email
winfried.koeniger@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 23 09
4 results
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Item type:Publication, Hidden Insurance in a Moral-Hazard EconomyWe analyze the general equilibrium of an economy in which a competitive industry produces nonexclusive insurance services. The equilibrium is inefficient because insurance contracts cannot control moral hazard, and welfare can be improved by policies that reduce insurance by increasing its price above marginal cost. We discuss how insurance production costs that exceed expected claim payments interact with moral hazard in determining the equilibrium's inefficiency, and show that these costs can make insurance premia so actuarially unfair as to validate the standard first-order conditions we exploit in our analysis.Type:journal articleJournal:The RAND Journal of EconomicsVolume:46Issue:4Scopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, On the Validity of the First-Order Approach with Moral Hazard and Hidden AssetsWith moral hazard and anonymous asset trade, first-order conditions need not characterize effort and portfolio choices. The standard procedure for establishing validity of the first-order approach in economies with one hidden asset is not fruitful when multiple assets are hidden.Type:journal articleJournal:Economics LettersVolume:124Issue:3Scopus© Citations 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Consumption Smoothing and Income RedistributionWe show theoretically that income redistribution benefits borrowing-constrained individuals more than is implied by standard relative-income and uninsurable-risk considerations. Empirically, we find in international opinion-survey data that younger and lower-income individuals express stronger support for government redistribution in countries where consumer credit is less easily available. This evidence supports our theoretical perspective if such individuals are more strongly affected by tighter credit supply, in that expectations of higher incomes in the future increase their propensity to borrow.Type:journal articleJournal:European Economic ReviewVolume:51Issue:8Scopus© Citations 12 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Dealer Pricing of Consumer CreditPrice discrimination incentives may induce dealers to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. We focus on how financial market imperfections make it possible to segment the customer population. When borrowing and lending rates differ from each other and from the rate of interest on a durable good purchase, the structure of those rates influences customers' choices to purchase on credit or cash terms, and the scope for dealers' price discrimination. Empirical analysis of a set of installment-credit, personal-loan, and regional interest rate data offers considerable support to the assumptions and implications of our theoretical framework.Type:journal articleJournal:International Economic ReviewVolume:46Issue:4Scopus© Citations 12