Mohr, ErnstErnstMohr2023-04-132023-04-131995-12-01https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/63063The climate policy issue is in a state where different visions or proposals compete with one another in the political arena. The success of such a vision or proposal largely depends on the success of its proponents in persuading the public or a yet undecided ultimate authority of its merits. This essay identifies a discounting related ambiguity in cost-benefit analyses of climate change, making two competing visions and proposals "legitimate." By placing the induced opportunity for greenhouse policy persuasion in a political economy context, it is shown how visionaries and lobbyists can exploit human time preferences for the purpose of greenhouse policy persuasion.enPublic investmentCost-benefit analysisClimate policyPersuasionSocial discount ratePsychological framingjournal article