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  4. Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage
 
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Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage

Journal
Journal of Public Economics
ISSN
0047-2727
ISSN-Digital
1879-2316
Type
journal article
Date Issued
2010-10-01
Author(s)
Hodler, Roland  
Loertscher, Simon
Rohner, Dominic
DOI
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.002
Abstract
We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.
Language
English
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher place
Amsterdam
Volume
94
Number
9-10
Start page
761
End page
767
Pages
7
URL
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/95845
Subject(s)

economics

Division(s)

SIAW - Swiss Institut...

SEPS - School of Econ...

Eprints ID
234966

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