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Martin Kolmar
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Kolmar
First name
Martin
Email
martin.kolmar@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2535
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 124
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Neue Zürcher Zeitung
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Social Choice and WelfareIssue: 55
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und VerwaltungsrechtVolume: 119
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Journal of economic behavior & organizationVolume: 142
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume: 17Issue: 3
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume: 17Issue: 1
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PublicationCostly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Non-Rival GoodsWe analyze the optimal relationship between the public and private enforcement of property rights for the case of rival and nonrival goods. Exclusion is interpreted as a costly activity, which allows it to endogenize the distinctions between public and club goods on the one hand and between private and common-pool goods on the other. We characterize optimality conditions for the private provision of rival and nonrival goods, characterize optimal enforcement policies, and compare the solutions with other institutional alternatives.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)Volume: 171Issue: 3
Scopus© Citations 1 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und UnternehmensethikVolume: 16Issue: 3
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PublicationThe State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of PropertyThe modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)Volume: 170Issue: 1