Christoph Henning

This paper discusses Philippe Van Parijs' book Real Freedom for All. It argues that the book was a cornerstorne of the debate on an unconditional basic income, but that it suffers from an internal contradiction nevertheless: On the one hand, it offers a perspective for a criticism of capitalism (based on the missing freedom not to work) which is very valuable after socialist alternatives have lost all credibility. On the other hand, it aims to defend ("justify") the same capitalism against its critics. Due to this theoretical double-bind, the book is forced to both prettify capitalism and to cover up the potential costs an unconditional basic income would have. It is argued that both effects do not strengthen, but rather weaken the case for an unconditional basic income.

The paper argues that Dewey‘s ethics is based on a naturalistic theory of value. This unusual interpretation questions the anti-naturalist reading of Dewey in the wake of Richard Rorty and other neo-pragmatists. In order to defend this interpretation, I develop a genealogy of Dewey‘s pragmatic naturalism: It has a ?father‘ in the progressivist move-ment, and a ?sister‘ in the Chicago Sociology. A closer look at Frank L. Ward, Albion Small, W.I. Thomas and Robert Park helps to reconstruct the political dynamics of the progressivist programme of naturalistic values. This contextualization may also correct some of the shortcomings of Dewey‘s own version: Some pragmatic sociologists spelled out the noncomformist individualism more clearly than Dewey‘s philosophy did. Finally I suggest that this approach is still relevant today.

Comment on Hermann Kocyba: "Recognition, Cooperation and the Moral Presuppositions of Capitalist Organization of Work" This comment on Kocyba's article discusses both his economic and moral assumptions, arguing that the shift from industrial capitalism towards a 'new spirit' of more autonomous forms of work is not captured by Kocyba's comparison between producing things alone and creating services together. Consequently, the main problem is not, as Kocyba believes, the determination of an individual's share in the (intangible) product, but the competitive mindset of this new spirit, which has many undesired consequences. Concerning the 'moral presuppositions' it is argued that the questionable self-restriction to 'immanent norms' induces a strong affirmative tendency which is at odds with Kocyba's critical aspirations. The idea that critical theory can only refer to norms which are already institutionalized needs to be dropped in order to revive the critical dimension. It is argued that Kocyba is already half way there and needs to make this break more explicit.