Katharina Hofer

How does transparency affect voting behavior? To answer this question we exploit a switch from a show of hands to electronic voting in the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament. The change, which took place halfway through the 2011–2015 legislative period, also brought about the online publication of individual voting records. Using the Lower House as a control group, we compare individual voting decisions in a set of identical votes in both chambers. This unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effect of increased transparency on legislators' choices. Since the reform, members of the Upper House are less likely to deviate from the majority decision of their party. Legislators representing the same canton are also less likely to cast an aligned vote, suggesting that voters lose influence over their representatives in parliament.

We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative. Politicians decide about a political compromise - a counter proposal - after which petitioners have the option to withdraw the initiative before the vote. In equilibrium, politicians infer the initiative's popularity from the number of signatures and collection time. The more the initiative is perceived as a threat to the status quo, the more likely politicians come up with a counter proposal. Under certain conditions, petitioners have the incentive to collect more signatures than required for qualification to demonstrate high success probability. We test model predictions using the data set of all Swiss constitutional initiatives at the federal level between 1891 and 2010. Overall, we find supporting evidence for the model mechanisms. Fast signature collection is associated with a higher probability of reform. The effect is mediated through a higher probability of provoking a counter proposal. Ultimately, counter proposals are key to amending the status quo. Restricting the signature collection time reduces the informative mechanism of the signature collection process considerably.

In 2014 the Swiss Upper House introduced an electronic voting system, which would make it easier to monitor the voting behavior of its legislators. In this system, individual decisions on specific exogenously defined vote types are published automatically, while all other votes are not publicly disclosed. The present paper uses this institutional change to determine, in a quasi-experimental setting, whether the monitoring of parliamentary voting influences legislators? incentives to participate in floor votes. In addition, video recordings of all sessions are used to determine pre- and post-reform attendance rates during secret votes. Attendance rates increase once legislators are subject to monitoring. This result cannot be explained by anticipation effects of the reform, the introduction of an electronic voting system, or election cycles. Attendance rises more among legislators who depend more heavily on their political career (full-time politicians, those with few interest groups, and incumbents running for re-election) than among their peers with better outside career options. Moreover, when voting is monitored, legislators abstain less and vote more often in line with their party majority.

This paper investigates whether popular initiatives signed by a larger share of the population have higher acceptance rates at the subsequent vote. The main analysis is based on all Swiss federal initiatives voted between 1978 and 2000 with a panel of aggregate voting data at cantonal level. The results suggest that petition signing is positively and significantly related to acceptance rates at ballot. I address potential omitted variable bias from underlying preferences which might be driving both signatures and acceptance rates in three ways. First, the panel structure of the data allows to control for time-constant preferences via fixed effects. Second, results are robust to various proxies for voter preferences. Third, using the doubling of the signature requirement in 1978 as an instrumental variable confirms the above result. The findings imply that petition signing can serve as an effective partisan campaigning tool.

This article highlights the social and economic importance of air freight, explains the operations of air freight supply chains and shows approaches that contribute to efficient air freight security regimes