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Björn Ambos
Title
Prof. Ph.D.
Last Name
Ambos
First name
Björn
Email
bjoern.ambos@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 7610
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1 - 4 of 4
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PublicationUnravelling Agency Relations inside the MNC: The Roles of Socialization, Goal Conflicts and Second Principals in Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships(Elsevier Science, 2019)In this paper, we propose and test an agency model for HQ-subsidiary relations. Drawing on classical agency assumptions, we develop a baseline hypothesis that links informal controls (i.e., socialization), HQ-subsidiary goal conflicts, and the HQ’s use of formal controls (i.e., behavioral controls). We subsequently introduce an important boundary condition, which reflects subsidiaries’ internal agency relations with subsidiary CEOs as second principals. More specifically, we argue that the baseline relationship only holds under low levels of second principal power. To test our model, we employed a unique study design with three parallel surveys addressing the agents and the two principals involved in 131 agency relations within one MNC.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of World BusinessVolume: 54Issue: 2
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PublicationGoal Conflicts and Corporate Control: Implications for Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships of Multinational CorporationsWhen applied in headquarters-subsidiary contexts, agency theory traditionally promotes behavioral vs. output controls for principals (headquarters) to manage their agents (subsidiaries). Existing studies, however, have both theoretically and empirically largely neglected the role of social controls. Two reasons support this: (1) Agency theory as-sumes within-subsidiary homogeneity when it comes to subsidiaries and control strategies, and (2) goal conflicts are not precisely conceptualized. In this study, we acknowledge within-subsidiary heterogeneity and advance a nuanced view on goal conflicts, differentiating between conflicts pushed by central vs. pushed by local units. Examining 131 function-specific dyads between a headquarters and its six subsidiaries of a European MNC, we find the distinction of goal conflicts to matter for the effects of socialization and choice of behavioral vs. output control strategies.Type: conference paper
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PublicationGoal Conflicts in the Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship: Corporate Control Effects and ImplicationsAlthough agency theory is a prominent perspective to investigate behavioral and outcome control in relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries with conflicting goals, the role of social control has largely been overlooked. Yet socialization can be a potent driver for reducing goal conflicts and hence agency problems. In this study, we theoretically advance and empirically test this basic hypothesis and the underlying mechanisms of socialization in their effect on goal conflicts, and subsequently other corporate controls. To do so, we look into bilateral relationships between central functions and their local counterparts, and distinguish between conflicts pushed by central vs. pushed by local units. Examining 131 agency relationships inside a headquarters and its six subsidiaries of a European MNC, we find the distinction of goal conflicts to matter for the use of corporate control strategies.Type: conference paper
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PublicationPrincipal-Agent Multiplicity in Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships of Multinational CorporationsThe relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries has been the focus of many studies applying diverse theories. A common yet somewhat dormant perspective is agency theory, which views headquarters as principals and subsidiaries as agents. While this perspective has facilitated analyses on e.g., subsidiary-specific control strategies, it falls short in recognizing the complexities found in contemporary MNCs. It is argued that agency relationships are not limited to the ones between headquarters and subsidiary top managers, but can be found on many levels. We build on the traditional notion, and theoretically advance it by allowing for internal units inside headquarters and subsidiaries. As a consequence, we find multiple agency relationships, as well as multiple principals to the same agent. Theoretical implications are discussed and propositions put forward.Type: conference paper