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Markus Schmid
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Schmid
First name
Markus
Email
markus.schmid@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 7001
Now showing
1 - 10 of 11
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PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationFinancial Advice and Retirement Savings
;Hoechle, Daniel ;Ruenzi, StefanType: conference paper -
PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationPeer Pressure in Corporate Earnings Management( 2017)
;Charles, ConstantinType: conference paper -
PublicationPeer Effects in Corporate Earnings Management( 2017)We show that peer firms play an important role in shaping corporate earnings management de-cisions. To overcome identification issues in isolating peer effects, we use fund flow-induced selling pressure by passive open-end equity mutual funds as exogenous shocks to firms’ stock prices. Managers respond to such exogenous price shocks by adjusting earnings management policies. We then measure individual firms’ reactions to changes in earnings management at peer firms as a result of such exogenous price shocks. The documented peer effect in earnings management is not only statistically, but also economically significant. Our results are robust to alternative measures of fund flow-induced selling pressure and earnings management, and to estimating instrumental variables regressions in which we instrument peer firms’ earnings man-agement with mutual fund flow-induced selling pressure.Type: conference paper
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PublicationAll Good Things Come to an End: CEO Tenure and Firm Value( 2016-04-08)
;Limbach, PeterScholz, MeikWe provide evidence that CEO tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value and M&A announcement returns, consistent with benefits (e.g., experience, learning, relations) and costs (e.g., CEO-firm mismatch, entrenchment, reluctance to change) arising over a CEO’s time in office. Depending on the dynamics of a firm’s economic environment which affect the cost-benefit relation of tenure, we find economically meaningful variation in the point in time at which costs start to outweigh benefits. The documented CEO life cycle is robust to a large set of robustness tests, including various alternative explanations, CEO-firm fixed effects, and nonparametric estimations, and is supported by an analysis of CEO sudden deaths. Economic recessions and regulatory changes in corporate governance as exogenous shocks to the cost-benefit relation of tenure further support our findings.Type: conference paper -
PublicationDo CEOs Matter? Corporate Performance and the CEO Life Cycle( 2016)This study suggests that the effect of CEOs on the firms they run varies over time.We document an inverted U-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value as well as M&A announcement returns, consistent with the posited net effect of benefits (e.g., learning, relations) and costs (e.g., aversion to change, entrenchment) arising dynamically over the CEO's time in office. We find economically meaningful variation in the point in time at which costs of tenure start to outweigh benefits depending on a firm's economic environment that affects costs and benefits of tenure. Nonparametric estimations, exogenous shocks to the cost-benefit relation of tenure, and an analysis of CEO sudden deaths further support our findings.Type: conference paper
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PublicationBoard Industry Experience and Executive Compensation( 2015-04-10)
;Drobetz, Wolfgang ;Oesch, DavidType: conference paper -
PublicationIndustry Expert Directors( 2015-12-16)
;Drobetz, Wolfgang ;Oesch, DavidWe analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors affects firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. Additional analyses, including a quasi-experimental setting based on director deaths, mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further tests show that the board industry experience-firm value relation is more pronounced for firms with larger investment programs, larger cash reserves, and during crises. In contrast, it is weaker in more dynamic industries where the value of previously acquired experience is likely to be diminished. We also provide some evidence that corporate governance problems in firms, in particular entrenched CEOs, and a limited supply of industry experts prevent firms from appointing more industry experts to their boards, even though this would be value-increasing. Overall, our findings are consistent with board industry experience being a valuable corporate governance mechanism.Type: conference paperDOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2256477