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Patrick Emmenegger
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Emmenegger
First name
Patrick
Email
patrick.emmenegger@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2332
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 162
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PublicationThe Limits of Decentralised Cooperation: The Promotion of Inclusiveness in Collective Skill Formation Systems?This paper examines how collective skill formation systems balance economic objectives related to competitiveness and social objectives related to inclusion. Based on a simple theoretical model, we argue that there are clear limits to how much inclusiveness can be achieved in collective skill formation systems. Firms are generally successful in resisting pressure by governments to be more inclusive because they benefit from their structural power in collective skill formation systems. Therefore, most pro-inclusiveness policies in such training systems do not require any firm-specific involvement. If pro-inclusiveness policies involve firms, employer associations typically participate in their development, trying to align the goal of inclusion with the economic interest of employers. Our two-level game model helps to understand this complex interaction between governments and firms. Empirical examples substantiate our expectations. They show how important it is to consider both levels simultaneously when analyzing inclusion-oriented training policy reforms.Type: journal articleJournal: Journal of European Public PolicyVolume: 28Issue: 2
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PublicationDisproportional Threat: Redistricting as an Alternative to Proportional Representation.Analyzing the voting behavior of Swiss members of parliament (MP) using newly collected individual, district, and cantonal level data, we show that both electoral disproportionalities and the insurgent parties’ electoral potential are important determinants of MP voting behavior on the adoption of proportional representation (PR). However, in contrast to the prominent electoral threat thesis, the insurgent party’s high electoral potential decreases the probability that MPs of established parties support PR. The reason for this relationship is partisan redistricting, whose relevance has so far been largely ignored in the literature. We demonstrate that adapting electoral district boundaries for political reasons, if possible in a given institutional context, can be a powerful alternative to the adoption of PR, because it allows established parties to retain parliamentary majorities even as an insurgent party’s electoral potential increases.Type: journal articleJournal: The Journal of PoliticsVolume: 83Issue: 3
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PublicationNew Interest Associations in a Neo-Corporatist System: Adapting the Swiss Training System to the Service Economy.Collective skill formation systems need to adapt to economic change, most notably the expansion of the service economy. However, deeply anchored in the craft and industrial sectors, these systems rely on neo-corporatist institutions to undergird firms’ training provision, which are often missing in the service sector. We show that Switzerland's voluntaristic approach to interest intermediation provided the flexibility needed to extend vocational training to economic sectors without neo-corporatist institutions. Yet, these adaptations resulted in the emergence of interest associations characterised by low levels of generalisability and governability. These new associations co-exist with neo-corporatist ones, rendering the overall training system surprisingly heterogeneous.Type: journal articleJournal: British Journal of Industrial RelationsVolume: 59Issue: 3
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PublicationSocial partner involvement in collective skill formation governance. A comparison of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland( 2020-02-12)Dual vocational education and training (VET) with social partner involvement in its governance can typically be found in collective skill formation systems. This article reviews the diversity of collective skill formation systems with a particular focus on their systemic governance. In particular, we look at the actors involved as well as how the systemic governance is organised in terms of corporatist decision-making bodies. The article shows that there are important cross-national differences. First, the social partners do not always participate in the decision-making at the political-strategic level. Second, social partner involvement is not always on equal terms (parity), with trade unions in some cases being less strongly involved. Third, differences in VET governance are particularly pronounced at the technical-operational level. Empirically, the article focuses on the five prototypical collective skill formation systems Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.Type: journal articleJournal: Transfer: European Review of Labour and ResearchVolume: 26Issue: 1
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PublicationWhy Do Junctures Become Critical? Political Discourse, Agency, and Joint Belief Shifts in Comparative Perspective(Wiley-Blackwell, 2020-10)
;Eberlein, BurkardSchneider, VolkerWhy do junctures become critical in some cases but not in others? Building on the critical juncture framework and perspectives on the formation and diffusion of beliefs, we develop a theoretically parsimonious and empirically traceable account of divergence in institutional outcomes. By illuminating the role of agency and joint belief shifts we further open the “black box” of critical junctures. In particular, we develop the argument that the role agents play is conditioned by conflict lines that structure an institutional field before a juncture sets in. Empirically, we trace political discourses around the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Canada, Germany, and Japan using discourse network analysis. Through comparative investigation, we empirically show that discursive interactions during potential critical junctures indicate institutional outcomes that are shaped by causally relevant historical legacies.Type: journal articleJournal: Regulation & GovernanceVolume: 14Issue: 4 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Socio-Economic ReviewVolume: 17Issue: 2
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PublicationThe Governance of Decentralized Cooperation in Collective Training Systems: A Review and Conceptualization( 2019)Trampusch, ChristineType: journal articleJournal: Journal of Vocational Education and TrainingVolume: 71Issue: 1
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PublicationThe Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the RichIn 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’Type: journal articleJournal: New Political EconomyVolume: 24Issue: 1
Scopus© Citations 37 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: British Journal of Industrial RelationsVolume: 57Issue: 3
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PublicationWhen Dominant Parties Adopt Proportional Representation. The Mysterious Case of Belgium( 2019-07)As the first country to introduce proportional representation (PR), Belgium has attracted considerable attention. Yet, we find the existing explanations for the 1899 breakthrough lacking. At the time of reform, the Catholic Party was politically dominant, advantaged by the electoral system, and facing reformist Socialists. Nevertheless, they single-handedly changed the electoral system and lost 26 seats in the first election under PR. We argue that the Catholics had good reasons to adopt PR. Majoritarian rules tend to create high levels of uncertainty because they provide incentives for non-dominant parties to cooperate. Such electoral coalitions are facilitated by multidimensional policy spaces that make electoral coalitions other than between nonsocialist parties possible. PR reduces the effectiveness of cooperation between non-dominant parties, but such certainty comes at a price. In addition, in the presence of dominant parties, divisions over electoral system reform often result in intra-party conflicts that may be more decisive than inter-party conflicts.Type: journal articleJournal: European Political Science ReviewVolume: 11Issue: 4
Scopus© Citations 5