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Patrick Emmenegger
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Emmenegger
First name
Patrick
Email
patrick.emmenegger@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2332
Homepage
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1 - 10 of 11
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PublicationType: forthcomingJournal: Comparative Political Studies
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PublicationIntroduction in Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics(Oxford University Press, 2023)
;Fossati, Flavia ;Häusermann, Silja ;Papadopoulos, Yannis ;Sciarini, PascalVatter, AdrianType: forthcoming -
PublicationThe Handbook of Swiss Politics(Oxford University Press, 2023)
;Fossati, Flavia ;Häusermann, Silja ;Papadopoulos, Yannis ;Sciarini, Pascal ;Vatter, Adrian ;Flavia Fossati ;Silja Häusermann ;Yannis Papadopoulos ;Pascal SciariniAdrian VatterType: forthcoming -
PublicationType: forthcomingJournal: Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics
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PublicationNeo-corporatism and collective skill formation: The policy network of Swiss professional training organizations.Global trends, such as an ever-rising service economy, rapid technological change and digitalization, challenge skill formation systems. Focussing on European countries, this edited volume examines the variety of European VET governance and VET governance research. In particular, it provides insights into regional, local and decentralized governance at meso (e.g. professional associations) as well as micro level (e.g. learning arrangements). As such, the edited volume sheds light on the hitherto far less explored dimensions of VET governance and highlights challenges as well as opportunities in VET governance in the 21st century.Type: forthcomingVolume: Governance Revisited: Challenges and Opportunities for VET.DOI: 10.3726/b18801
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PublicationWirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik(NZZ Libro, 2022-03-14)
;Papadopoulos, Yannis ;Sciarini, Pascal ;Vatter, Adrian ;Häusermann, SiljaFossati, Flavia -
PublicationDirect Democracy, Coalition Size, and Public SpendingThis article contributes to the literature on direct democracy and public spending in two ways. First, we explore how direct democratic institutions interact with a specific aspect of the representative system, the size of the governing coalition, to influence public spending. Second, based on newly collected data, we examine the relationship between three different direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending over the period from 1860 to 2015. Empirically, we find that initiatives increase the size of the public sector under single-party governments, but this positive relationship disappears as coalition size increases. In contrast, we find that financial referendums slow down the growth of public spending, while law referendums are not systematically associated with public spending. Finally, we find that the relationship between direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending does not change over time despite the long period under investigation.Type: forthcomingJournal: Journal of Public PolicyVolume: 42Issue: 2
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PublicationBildungspolitik.(NZZ Libro, 2022-03-14)
;Giudici, Anja ;Papadopoulos, Yannis ;Sciarini, Pascal ;Vatter, Adrian ;Häusermann, SiljaFossati, Flavia -
PublicationAgency in Historical Institutionalism: Coalitional Work in the Creation, Maintenance, and Change of Institution. Theory and SocietyInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.Type: forthcomingJournal: Theory and societyVolume: 50 (4)
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PublicationNo Direct Taxation Whithout New Elite Representation: Industrialization and the Domestic Politics of Taxation.The nineteenth century marked the founding period of modern public finance. We examine the domestic and non-war related determinants of direct taxation in this early democratic period and in a state building context. We argue that the reasons for the expansion of direct taxation can be found in the political competition between different elite groups in the context of industrialization. Systematically differentiating between economic and political arenas, we show that intra-elite competition in industrializing economies leads to higher levels of direct taxation only if the new economic elites are able to translate their economic power into the political arena, either through the representative system or by extra-parliamentary means. In addition, we demonstrate that these processes are directly linked to public investments in policy areas related to the interests of new economic elites such as public education. Our analysis is based on novel subnational data from the period 1850 to 1910, enabling us to concentrate on the domestic determinants of direct taxation.Type: forthcomingJournal: European Journal of Political ResearchVolume: 60Issue: 3