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Patrick Emmenegger
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Emmenegger
First name
Patrick
Email
patrick.emmenegger@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2332
Homepage
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1 - 5 of 5
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PublicationDesigning Electoral Districts for New Proportional Representation Systems: How Electoral Geography and Partisan Politics Constrain Proportionality and Create Bias.Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems have become widespread because they are expected to ensure the representation of interests with small or geographically inefficiently distributed voter bases. Yet in reality, most PR systems consist of a large number of districts that vary substantially in size, and some have surprisingly low magnitude. Existing research shows that such differences matter greatly for political outcomes but offers no explanation for their origins. We argue that the design of electoral districts in newly adopted PR systems is systematically linked to electoral geography and partisan politics. If parties with concentrated voter bases can influence the design of the new electoral system, they will create a significant number of low-magnitude districts. In general, parties involved in designing districts benefit from electoral disproportionalities under the new PR rules. Empirically, we use newly collected district-level data for several Western European countries in the early twentieth century.
Scopus© Citations 1 -
PublicationDisproportional Threat: Redistricting as an Alternative to Proportional Representation.Analyzing the voting behavior of Swiss members of parliament (MP) using newly collected individual, district, and cantonal level data, we show that both electoral disproportionalities and the insurgent parties’ electoral potential are important determinants of MP voting behavior on the adoption of proportional representation (PR). However, in contrast to the prominent electoral threat thesis, the insurgent party’s high electoral potential decreases the probability that MPs of established parties support PR. The reason for this relationship is partisan redistricting, whose relevance has so far been largely ignored in the literature. We demonstrate that adapting electoral district boundaries for political reasons, if possible in a given institutional context, can be a powerful alternative to the adoption of PR, because it allows established parties to retain parliamentary majorities even as an insurgent party’s electoral potential increases.Type: journal articleJournal: The Journal of PoliticsVolume: 83Issue: 3
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PublicationWhen Dominant Parties Adopt Proportional Representation. The Mysterious Case of Belgium( 2019-07)As the first country to introduce proportional representation (PR), Belgium has attracted considerable attention. Yet, we find the existing explanations for the 1899 breakthrough lacking. At the time of reform, the Catholic Party was politically dominant, advantaged by the electoral system, and facing reformist Socialists. Nevertheless, they single-handedly changed the electoral system and lost 26 seats in the first election under PR. We argue that the Catholics had good reasons to adopt PR. Majoritarian rules tend to create high levels of uncertainty because they provide incentives for non-dominant parties to cooperate. Such electoral coalitions are facilitated by multidimensional policy spaces that make electoral coalitions other than between nonsocialist parties possible. PR reduces the effectiveness of cooperation between non-dominant parties, but such certainty comes at a price. In addition, in the presence of dominant parties, divisions over electoral system reform often result in intra-party conflicts that may be more decisive than inter-party conflicts.Type: journal articleJournal: European Political Science ReviewVolume: 11Issue: 4
Scopus© Citations 5 -
PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Electoral StudiesVolume: 59
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PublicationType: journal articleJournal: Swiss Political Science Review : SPSRVolume: 25Issue: 1