Thomas Zellweger
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Prof. Dr.
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Zellweger
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Thomas
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thomas.zellweger@unisg.ch
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+41 71 224 71 00
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Now showing 1 - 10 of 53
  • Publication
    Succession processes in family firms: A new temporal perspective
    ( 2024)
    Christine Scheef
    ;
    Thomas Zellweger orcid-logo
    Succession is the most prominent topic in family business research and the succession path that a family chooses will likely impact the future performance of the business. Yet surprisingly little is known about how management, board, and ownership is transitioned from one generation to the next. Using an inductive, theory-building approach based on sequence analysis and evidence from succession paths in 116 public family firms in the US, we address this gap. We introduce the concept of succession path, which describes how management, board, and ownership transitions are structured over time. Our study reveals six distinct succession paths, which vary in their pace and rhythm, but show high similarity in the sequence of the transition. Further, we study the firm performance consequences of succession paths. Specifically, we find that family firms with fast-paced succession paths and those with slow-paced, but rhythmic succession paths outperform those with slow-paced irregular rhythms. Further, early-ownership transitions benefit firm performance. Establishing succession paths as a meaningful new concept in family business research, this study not only advances our understanding of the succession phenomenon but also extends our theoretical insights into temporal processes in family firm successions.
    Type: conference paper
    Journal: International Family Enterprise Research Academy (IFERA) Annual Meeting
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/119787
  • Publication
    Owner duality – when the main owner also is the board chair
    ( 2024-01-23)
    Sebastian Sigg
    ;
    Thomas Zellweger orcid-logo
    We study ‘owner duality’, hence when an individual is the largest owner of a firm and simultaneously serves as the firm’s board chair. To explore the firm growth implications of owner duality, we analyze a sample of publicly listed U.S. firms under control of individual owners. Upon dissecting owner duality into its two constituent elements, namely ownership concentration and board chair position, we find that ownership concentration in the hands of individuals by itself promotes firm growth. However, when ownership concentration is combined with the board chair position, firm growth suffers. Examining the causal mechanism underlying this negative effect, we find that owner duality engenders controversies with non-shareholding stakeholders, which harms growth. We find that executive ownership is effective while board independence is ineffective in curbing the growth penalty tied to owner duality. Our study introduces the concept of owner duality to the literature and adds to the new stakeholder theory of the firm.
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120743
  • Publication
    When the Main Owner is the Board Chair: Too Much of a Good Thing for Stakeholders and Firm Growth
    ( 2024)
    Sebastian Sigg
    ;
    Thomas Zellweger orcid-logo
    We study ‘owner duality’, hence when an individual is the largest owner of a firm and simultaneously serves as the firm’s board chair. To explore the firm growth implications of owner duality, we analyze a sample of publicly listed U.S. firms under control of individual owners. Upon dissecting owner duality into its two constituent elements, namely ownership concentration and board chair position, we find that ownership concentration in the hands of individuals by itself promotes firm growth. However, when ownership concentration is combined with the board chair position, firm growth suffers. Examining the causal mechanism underlying this negative effect, we find that owner duality engenders controversies with non-shareholding stakeholders, which harms their commitment to the firm and undermines growth. We find that executive ownership is effective while board independence is ineffective in curbing the growth penalty tied to owner duality. Our study introduces the concept of owner duality to the literature and adds to the new stakeholder theory of the firm.
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120033
  • Publication
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/117895
  • Publication
    Ownership matters! The benefits of appointing the predecessor CEO as board chair in family firm
    ( 2023)
    Christine Scheef
    ;
    Thomas Zellweger orcid-logo
    How does the appointment of a predecessor CEO as board chair (i.e., predecessor retention) affect post-succession firm performance? Agency theory suggests that firms with predecessor retention underperform compared to firms with other board chairs. We propose a stakeholder perspective rooted in incomplete contracting theory to highlight positive performance effects of predecessor retention. Stakeholders with firm-specific investments are concerned about being held up by new CEOs, which leads to negative stakeholder reactions upon CEO successions and post-succession performance declines. Because predecessor CEOs hold more firm-specific resources than other board chairs, they are well positioned to monitor and advise on stakeholder problems and mitigate performance declines after CEO successions. We identify family firms as a context in which the gains from mitigating negative stakeholder reactions outweigh the agency costs tied to predecessor retention. Probing a sample of CEO successions in the S&P 1500, we find that in family firms, predecessor retention leads to performance advantages over other board chairs, whereas the opposite holds true for nonfamily firms. We show that within the group of family firms, the performance advantages from predecessor retention increase in three contexts in which negative stakeholder reactions are pronounced: in outside CEO successions, in departures of long-tenured CEOs, and in firms with low complexity. Substantiating negative stakeholder reactions as the core mechanism, we show that predecessor retention decreases negative stakeholder reactions after CEO successions in family firms but not in nonfamily firms. Our study makes important contributions to the board chair and CEO succession literatures.
    Type: conference paper
    Journal: International Corporate Governance Society Conference, Madrid
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/117991
  • Publication
    The Impact Of Changing Age And Gender Norms On Entrepreneurship: A Cohort Study
    (Babson College, 2023-06-09)
    Mateja Andric
    ;
    Josh Wei-Jun Hsueh
    ;
    Isabella Hatak
    ;
    Thomas Zellweger orcid-logo
    Social norms regarding age- and gender-appropriate behaviors exert a strong influence on how entrepreneurs organize their lives. We examine the implications of socio-historical changes in age and gender norms for entrepreneurship by elucidating how the typical life stage at the time of entrepreneurial entry has shifted across socio-historical cohorts of entrepreneurs, as well as how the performance consequences of being married or having children at the time of entrepreneurial entry have changed over time. Based on cohort analyses of US self-employment data from the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we find that individuals today are less likely to be married and to have children when they enter entrepreneurship compared to entrepreneurs in the past. In addition, gender differences in the effect of being married and having children on entrepreneurial performance have decreased over time.
    Type: conference paper
    Journal: Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, BCERC Proceedings
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/117471
  • Publication
    Succession processes in family firms: A new perspective
    ( 2023)
    Scheef, Christine
    ;
    Zellweger, Thomas orcid-logo
    Succession is the most prominent topic in family business research and the succession path that a family chooses will likely impact the future performance of the business. Yet surprisingly little is known about succession paths⸻the sequence, pace, and rhythm with which management, board, and ownership is transitioned from one generation to the next. Using an inductive, theory-building approach based on sequence analysis and evidence from succession paths in 142 public family firms in the US, we address this gap. Our study reveals nine distinct succession paths with five distinct sequences of how management, board, and ownership transitions are structured over time. These sequences not only vary in their pace and rhythm, but also in their performance consequences. Specifically, we find that family firms with fast-paced succession paths and those with slow-paced, rhythmic succession paths outperform those with irregular rhythms. Further, early-ownership transitions benefit firm performance. Establishing succession paths as a meaningful new concept in family business research, this study not only advances our understanding of the succession phenomenon but also extends our theoretical insights into temporal processes in family firm successions.
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/117223
  • Publication
    Type: conference paper
    Journal: Proceedings of the Eighty-second Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/108422
  • Publication
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/108431
  • Publication
    Type: conference paper
    URI: https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/108430