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Dimitrios Georgakakis
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Georgakakis
First name
Dimitrios
Email
dimitrios.georgakakis@unisg.ch
Now showing
1 - 10 of 16
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PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationCEO Intra-personal Experience Diversity and Strategic Change: Toward a Nuanced Understanding(Academy of Management Meeting, 2021-08)
;Mueller, PhilippAre new CEOs with diverse career experience more likely to promote strategic change early after their appointment? We attempt to address this question by integrating seemingly opposing predictions in the managerial cognition literature. We argue that new CEOs with high and low levels of intra-personal experience diversity will promote higher strategic change early after taking charge – compared to those at relatively moderate levels. Analyzing 115 CEO successions, we find support for the theorized U-shaped relationship between intra-personal CEO experience diversity and strategic change. Furthermore, our results suggest that this relationship is influenced by post-CEO-succession TMT turnover. We contribute to the literature on strategic change by adding a more nuanced perspective to the emerging research on new CEO career experience diversity, and its effects on corporate strategy.Type: conference paper -
PublicationGetting Paid When the Books Are Cooked: CEO Initial Compensation in the Aftermath of Financial Misconduct(International Corporate Governance Society Conference, 2021-10-09)
;Wedell-Wedellsborg, MadsGreve, PederWith the increase in uncertainty during disruptive times, the focus on firm-level wrongdoing is ever more evident. Firm-level misconduct, such as financial fraud, restatement issues, or other similar harmful activities, affects not only the firm itself but also various internal and external stakeholders. Following large scale examples such as Enron (Fazrad,2005) and, more recently, Volkswagen, there is a need to emphasise further the knowledge on corporate governance responses to resolve the matter (König, et al., 2020). This paper looks at a typical corporate governance response, replacement of the CEO, through new lenses. Replacing the CEO can result from firms engaging in scapegoating by the board of directors to find and signal a change following firm-wide misconduct (Buyl, et al., 2015). Nevertheless,in most cases, the CEO is knowingly aware of the matter (Beasley, et al., 2010), meaning that a replacement of the CEO is the appropriate decision to resolve the misconduct issues. The paper combines aspects from the literature on executive pay (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Moriarty, 2005), particularly focusing on the initial remuneration (Graffin, et al., 2013; Graffin, et al., 2020; Chen, 2015) with financial fraud literature. The latter area has attracted interest from multiple fields such as strategic management (Koch-Bayram & Wernicke, 2018; Park, et al., 2020; Castro, et al., 2020), accounting & finance (Li, et al., 2020) and international business(Bahoo, et al., 2020; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). The paper shows that a new CEO entering a firm in a post-misconduct regime faces higher job demands than CEOs taking over a firm without misconduct. The added complexity and job demands lead to higher initial pay for the new CEO in a post-misconduct situation. By utilising a dataset on executive compensation and data on firms violating the US Security and Exchange Commission’s laws (SEC) (Dechow, et al., 2011), we show empirical support for our main hypothesis regarding a larger compensation package in a post-financial misconduct context. We further test for various moderating factors.Type: conference paper -
PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationChanging Regimes: New CEO ideology and early departure(Strategic Management Society Special Conference, 2019-03)Cannella, AlbertType: conference paper
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PublicationCEO generalist experience and CEO pay(Academy of Management Conference, 2019-08)Type: conference paper
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PublicationWhen more pays less: CEO career variety and CEO initial compensation( 2018-08)
;Mueller, PhilippStudies show that generalist CEOs with high levels of career variety receive higher compensation. Challenging this prevailing assumption, we acknowledge the drawbacks of extensive levels of CEO career variety and predict an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO career variety and CEO initial compensation. Integrating the generalism and specialization views of human capital, we postulate that, at an initial stage, the merits of increasingly varied human capital increase a CEO’s value and hence promote higher levels of compensation. After a threshold, however, the drawbacks associated with extensive levels of career variety offset its merits, gradually diminishing CEO value and pay.Type: conference paper -
PublicationType: conference paper
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PublicationJack of all trades or master of none? CEO experience variety and firm performance(Academy of Management Meeting, 2017-08)Type: conference paper